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Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American 
Law 
David Marcus∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The term “trans-substantive” refers to doctrine that, in form and manner 
of application, does not vary from one substantive context to the next. Trans-
substantivity has long influenced the design of the law of civil procedure, and 
whether the principle should continue to do so has prompted a lot of debate 
among scholars. But this focus on civil procedure is too narrow. Doctrines that 
regulate all the processes of American law, from civil litigation to public 
administration, often hew to a trans-substantive norm. This Article draws 
upon administrative law, the doctrine of statutory interpretation, and the law 
of civil procedure to offer a more complete account of trans-substantivity that 
explains the principle in all of the contexts in which it surfaces. This inquiry 
leads to a novel defense of trans-substantivity as a principle of doctrinal design. 
Trans-substantivity is justified as a response to deficits in the performance of 
institutions that craft and administer interpretive, procedural, and 
administrative law. This defense not only challenges the prevailing skepticism 
in procedural scholarship regarding the principle’s normative appeal. It also 
provides a metric to determine when doctrine should remain trans-substantive, 
and when doctrine may legitimately splinter into substance-specific strains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Frank Ricci’s suit for employment discrimination against the 
New Haven Fire Department was extraordinary.1 Very few cases get 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, much less remake an emotionally-
charged, often-politicized area of law. But the suit was also ordinary. 
Ricci first requested help from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), as 80,000 people do each year.2 He then 
commenced a lawsuit in the District of Connecticut using a form of 
 
 1. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 2. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013). 
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complaint that differed in no material respect from one for a simple 
tort action or another for complicated antitrust claims.3 To decipher 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court majority 
invoked the same canon of construction that the Court had deployed 
two days before the opinion’s release to interpret the False Claims 
Act,4 and that a federal district court would use the next day for the 
Wiretap Act of 1968.5 The various courts handling Ricci’s case also 
had to figure out what deference they owed to the EEOC’s 
interpretation of Title VII, a problem of the sort that the Supreme 
Court has encountered over one thousand times since the mid-
1980s, in cases involving a vast array of agency actions.6 
Something interesting lies in this ordinariness. Title VII may 
have provided the relevant legal regime to determine whether the 
NHFD’s promotion practices injured Ricci. But three species of 
doctrine—the law of federal civil procedure, federal administrative 
law, and statutory interpretation doctrine—regulated the processes 
by which the EEOC and several federal courts resolved his dispute. 
Many of the rules that constitute these species are trans-substantive: 
these rules’ form and manner of application do not vary depending 
upon the antecedent legal regime that the dispute implicates, 
whether it is Title VII, the Sherman Act, or Connecticut tort 
doctrine. To support its use of the interpretive canon, the Supreme 
Court in Ricci v. Destefano cited a case involving the allocation of 
liability for cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.7 A dissenting 
justice used a deference standard for the EEOC’s interpretation of 
Title VII that originated in a case involving the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Interstate Commerce Act.8 Ricci styled his 
complaint pursuant to a generic rule that does not impose any 
 
 3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). 
 4. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (using 
the rule against surplusage). 
 5. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *10 (E.D. 
Wis. June 30, 2009). 
 6. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008). 
 7. Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (citing United States v. Atlantic 
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007)) (using rule against surplusage). 
 8. Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing a deference standard set in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971), which in turn cited United States v. City of Chicago, 400 
U.S. 8 (1970)). 
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particular pleading obligation on employment discrimination 
plaintiffs.9 
Trans-substantivity is one of the most fundamental principles of 
doctrinal design for modern civil procedure,10 and it has prompted 
an extensive body of commentary since Robert Cover coined the 
term in 1975.11 Although abundant, this literature suffers from two 
significant and related limitations. First, with few exceptions, 
scholars have examined trans-substantivity exclusively as the 
principle influences the development and form of procedural 
doctrine.12 This focus is too narrow. The legal processes of court-
based litigation and public administration constantly intersect and 
overlap, as they did for Ricci, and trans-substantive rules often 
govern administrative and interpretive issues, not just procedural 
ones. Trans-substantivity is a phenomenon of process generally-
conceived, not just one of court-based procedure. 
The second shortcoming follows from the first. Consistent with 
their constrained gaze, commentators have evaluated trans-
substantivity in terms of problems of civil procedure and their 
possible solutions. Some have argued, for example, that the 
principle’s rigidity creates regrettable litigation costs, because trans-
substantive doctrine produces wasteful discovery in cases that would 
proceed better if governed by tailored rules.13 This sort of analysis, 
 
 9. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). 
 10. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
535, 536 [hereinafter Burbank, General Rules]. 
 11. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 
YALE L.J. 718 (1975); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in 
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375–76 nn.25–26 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, 
Trans-Substantivity] (citing articles). 
 12. Administrative law scholarship includes plenty of discussion of what doctrine should 
be in specialized areas like patent or tax law, but not systematic inquiries into trans-
substantivity more generally. See, e.g., Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831 (2012); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the 
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007). A couple 
of studies of trans-substantivity in criminal procedure have been written. See, e.g., William J. 
Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
842 (2001). One scholar of statutory interpretation has questioned his field’s trans-substantive 
assumption, but in a way that uses the term “trans-substantive” differently than I do here. See 
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 
(1998) (arguing against “trans-substantive” interpretive doctrine, but implicitly suggesting that 
“administrative law” is a substance-specific category). Otherwise, the term “trans-substantive” 
tends to be used casually, without much discussion, except in procedural scholarship. 
 13. Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective 
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however valuable, is incomplete. Trans-substantive doctrine 
regulates aspects of all sorts of processes, judicial and administrative 
alike, and concerns particular to the procedural regulation of civil 
litigation do not exhaust the range of justifications for or arguments 
against the principle. 
This Article is the first to explain and defend trans-substantivity 
as it influences the design of what I call “process law,” a category 
that includes the various species of doctrine that govern decision-
making processes in American law. I make three contributions. First, 
I offer a more complete and accurate account of the principle than 
those found in previous scholarly efforts, which have described 
trans-substantivity solely in terms of civil procedure.  
Second, by inquiring into the reasons for and against the 
principle in process law generally and not civil procedure narrowly, I 
move past decades-old debates over the normative justification for 
trans-substantivity and arrive at a novel defense of its persistence. 
Trans-substantivity, I argue, responds to a set of institutional deficits 
that can degrade the quality of procedural, interpretive, and 
administrative doctrine that judges fashion. The principle strengthens 
the legitimacy of this process law, protects it from inexpert or biased 
manipulation, and enables it more effectively to achieve desired 
policy objectives. Rooted in observations about comparative 
institutional competence, my justification challenges the prevailing 
skepticism regarding the normative appeal of trans-substantivity.14 
Third, my justification for trans-substantivity has important 
implications for doctrinal design. Process law is by no means 
uniformly trans-substantive, as illustrated by the particularized 
pleading standard that applies in securities fraud litigation,15 or the 
idiosyncratic interpretive practices courts use for the Taft-Hartley 
Act.16 A recurring and important question for the development of 
procedural, interpretive, and administrative law asks whether a 
 
Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–46 (1994). 
 14. Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
319, 334 (2008) (arguing that “the optimal level of generality” for procedural rules “should be 
determined not by reference to some trans-substantive ideal, but by balancing the costs and 
benefits of general versus more specific rules”). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 16. E.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are 
“Common-Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyam 
Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013) (draft at 1–2). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/25/2014 1:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1196 
particular doctrine should remain trans-substantive or assume a 
substance-specific form. Commentary on trans-substantivity that 
covers only procedural terrain provides no general metric to guide 
responses. My account offers a way to evaluate the legitimacy of 
substance-specific process law that judges craft. As courts make this 
doctrine, they can properly deviate from the trans-substantive norm 
under circumstances that enable them to overcome the institutional 
limitations that otherwise counsel in favor of trans-substantivity. 
My Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I define “process law,” 
defend my choice to treat trans-substantivity as a phenomenon of 
process law generally, and explore the meaning of “trans-
substantivity.” I describe trans-substantivity’s entrenchment in mid-
twentieth century procedural and administrative doctrine in Part II. 
This history is relevant for two reasons. The similar courses the 
principle followed in procedural and administrative contexts confirm 
that trans-substantivity emerges from and responds to forces that are 
not peculiar to civil procedure. Also, institutions and their 
constraints play a significant role in trans-substantivity’s twentieth 
century experience, a fact that should at least inform an account of 
the principle going forward. The history leads to Part III, in which I 
offer my institutional justification for trans-substantivity in judge-
made process law. I close in Part IV with some implications that my 
account has for the design of procedural, administrative, and 
interpretive doctrine. 
I. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITIES 
Process law is a new term, and I need to explain why it offers a 
useful and coherent category for the analysis of trans-substantivity in 
procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine. In this Part, I 
define “process law” and give several reasons to support an account 
of trans-substantivity pitched at its level. I also explain what I mean 
by “trans-substantivity,” a shape-shifting term that lacks a settled 
meaning in existing commentary. 
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A. Process Law 
1. The term 
A lot of law—Equal Protection doctrine,17 Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,18 remedies law,19 and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),20 for instance—gets saddled with the label 
“trans-substantive.” Even tort law arguably qualifies. Negligence 
purports to cover many varieties of unintended interactions, ranging 
from surgical mishaps to car crashes. If each type of accident 
constitutes its own substantive category, then tort law is trans-
substantive. An attempt to explain the principle everywhere it 
arguably surfaces would quickly spin out of control, or at best yield 
little more than the trivial observation that legal categorization 
requires abstraction. 
I limit my study of trans-substantivity to its many manifestations 
in what I call “process law.” Procedural, administrative, and 
interpretive doctrine all regulate the legal processes of public 
administration and court-based litigation. An event or set of 
circumstances with potential legal meaning or significance happens 
or evolves. A legal process begins in order to resolve this uncertain 
state of affairs. Public processes21 include civil litigation like the case 
Ricci pursued. They also include various types of agency actions, 
ranging from informal rule-making to decisions by customs agents to 
fix tariffs for imports at ports of entry. The law that regulates these 
processes is, logically enough, what I mean by “process law.”22 
 
 17. See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the 
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2002). 
 18. Stuntz, supra note 12, at 842. 
 19. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (applying 
“well-established principles of equity” to determine when an injunction might be issued, and 
implying that different principles should not apply in patent cases); EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. 
RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xv–xxiv (6th ed. 2005) (organizing the subject of 
remedies around substantive categories). But cf. David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an 
Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
627, 631–32 (1988) (arguing that remedies law is “compartmentalized” based on substance but 
should not be). 
 20. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory 
Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 659 n.108 (1991) (describing NEPA as 
trans-substantive). 
 21. Plenty of legal processes, like mediation and arbitration, are private. I exclude them 
from my analysis and only address public processes. 
 22. This definition excludes remedies law, which doesn’t regulate legal processes but 
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I use this term instead of “procedure,” the obvious alternative, 
for several reasons. “Procedure” has connotations that do not reflect 
what process law encompasses and what it does. The ordinary 
meaning of “procedure,” for example, usually does not include 
interpretive doctrine.23 Also, “procedure” conjures up the 
substance/procedure divide, a dichotomy that does not account for 
the problems that process law often confronts. A process is legal 
because it implicates an antecedent regime of law, like Title VII in 
Ricci’s case. Many of the challenges that process law encounters 
arise from its intersection with the antecedent regime. Should a 
federal court apply New York’s rule that prohibits class actions for 
the enforcement of a particular insurance law, or does Rule 23 
preempt state law?24 The procedural determination has obvious 
substantive ramifications, and thus the problem may fairly be 
understood as one involving the collision between “substance” and 
“procedure.”25 
But analogous problems arising in legal processes often have 
nothing to do with procedure’s relation to substance. Process law 
can uncomfortably intersect with antecedent regimes that 
themselves are entirely procedural. The Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA), for example, provides that, upon a case’s removal to federal 
court, a plaintiff can appeal “not less than 7 days” after the district 
court denies her motion to remand.26 This language appears to 
authorize an indefinite time to appeal and, as such, is a drafting 
error. “Less” in this instance really means “more.”27 But the fact that 
 
instead is in some fashion the concrete actualization of substantive law. See Owen M. Fiss, 
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1979) (describing remedies as the 
means for actualizing rights upon their articulation); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 
YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 (1983) (arguing that remedial possibilities shape the articulation of 
constitutional rights); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 857, 931 (1999) (“When a common law court decides rules about what constitutes a 
breach of a contract or a tort, and when it decides what remedy is warranted for the breach or 
tort, . . . the two decisions are based on the same sorts of considerations.”). 
 23. By interpretation I do not mean to refer to interpretation in the literary theory sense 
of the term. By this meaning of interpretation, adjudication is arguably a form of interpretation. 
See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982). 
 24. See generally Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 
(2010). 
 25. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities 
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 68–74 (2010). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006). 
 27. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 
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one would conventionally describe the antecedent regime (CAFA’s 
removal provision) as procedural does not lessen the difficulty courts 
encounter as they deploy interpretive doctrine to make sense of the 
statute.28 The problem involves a clash of institutional prerogatives: 
does process doctrine—in this instance practices of statutory 
interpretation—give courts legitimate authority to rewrite an 
otherwise-clear text Congress enacted? 
A better description of process law, one that gets beyond the 
substance/procedure dichotomy, defines it, first, in terms of a 
relational trait, and second, in terms of the tasks that process law 
discharges. The relational trait has to do with process law’s 
necessary connection to an antecedent legal regime. Before a rule of 
process law has any operational meaning, in terms of how it affects 
decision-maker or participant behavior, a set of circumstances 
implicating some legal regime must emerge. Some sort of legal 
process must commence to resolve authoritatively these 
circumstances’ legal significance. An example comes from statutory 
interpretation. The ejusdem generis canon provides that the meaning of 
a general term at the end of a list in a section of a statute takes on 
the meaning of the more precise terms that precede it.29 On its own, 
the canon has no real meaning. Once a merchant plans to build a gas 
station in Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania, however, the canon 
becomes important. A zoning ordinance there permits the operation 
of “shops, stores, or other indoor facilities.”30 Whether a gas station 
qualifies as an “indoor facility” may depend on the canon’s 
application.31 
Process law is also distinguishable in terms of the two types of 
tasks it discharges. The first type of task is incontestably procedural. 
The time FRCP 4 gives a defendant to answer a complaint is an 
example. By no understanding of the term “substance” could the 
rule, concerned entirely with the fairness and efficiency of civil 
litigation, qualify. The second type of task helps to distinguish law 
 
137–42 (2009). 
 28. See generally Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 
448 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2006) (reporting opinion of five judges dissenting from Ninth Circuit’s 
refusal to rehear en banc a case involving the interpretation of this text). 
 29. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 253–54 
(2000). 
 30. In re Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 A.3d 535, 538 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
 31. Id. at 540 (discussing ejusdem generis). 
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that regulates some sort of procedure but is not properly understood 
as process law. If some doctrine performs a function that is not 
incontestably procedural, it qualifies as process law only if the rights 
the doctrine creates or the obligations or duties the doctrine imposes 
necessarily derive, at least in part, from the antecedent regime.  
The heightened pleading standard the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act prescribes for securities fraud claims, for 
example, counts as process law. The pleading standard cloaks 
substantive policy in procedural guise and thus uncomfortably 
straddles the substance/procedure divide.32 But the pleading 
standard has operational significance only upon the occurrence of a 
set of circumstances that might implicate the federal securities laws, 
the relevant antecedent regime. Moreover, although the standard is 
not incontestably procedural, a court cannot determine whether a 
plaintiff has met the obligations it imposes without reference to 
federal securities laws (the antecedent regime). NEPA, in contrast, 
does not qualify as process law. NEPA obliges the federal 
government to provide an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
when the government wants to take certain actions “significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”33 NEPA applies 
when an agency wants to take some action pursuant to some other 
statutory authority, and in this sense NEPA arguably requires an 
antecedent legal regime to have operational significance. Few would 
describe NEPA as incontestably procedural, since it serves 
environmental policy objectives and does not simply concern itself 
with the fairness or efficiency of some legal process. Also, its 
objectives are not externally-determined. A decision-maker can 
decide whether an agency satisfied its obligations under NEPA 
without reference to the antecedent regime.34 
 
 32. E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 223 (2004) (“The 
PSLRA . . . involve[s] a deliberate crossing of the line between substance and procedure.”). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
 34. Recent Ninth Circuit opinions applying the EIS requirement are illustrative. In none 
of them did the court anchor the EIS requirement to some other legal obligation and instead 
evaluated the government’s behavior according to NEPA itself. Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power 
Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2012); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 697 F.3d 
1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012); Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084, 
1100–03 (9th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893, 913–14 (9th Cir. 
2012); League of Wilderness Defenders–Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
689 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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2. Trans-substantivity as a process law principle 
For five reasons, I offer my analysis of trans-substantivity at the 
level of process law, as a category embracing procedural, 
administrative, and interpretive doctrine.35 First, each of these 
species includes a lot of doctrine that is incontrovertibly trans-
substantive. Again, tort law is trans-substantive if “surgical 
operations” and “automobile accidents” count as substantive 
categories. But if the proper category is “tort,” then tort law is 
substance-specific. In contrast, regardless of how one conceptualizes 
substantive categories, trans-substantive doctrine composes 
significant swaths of each species of process law. The realist Leon 
Green famously removed arguably trans-substantive abstractions like 
“negligence” and “strict liability” from his torts casebook, replacing 
them with “keeping of animals,” “timber, crops, minerals,” and 
other such categories.36 Charles Alan Wright identified his treatise 
on federal practice as a realist equivalent for civil procedure,37 yet it 
remains organized in trans-substantive terms. Perhaps trans-
substantivity is more central to doctrinal design of process law than 
it is elsewhere. 
Second, while court-based litigation and public administration 
may differ in some fundamental ways, they often overlap, they often 
merge, and they often are treated as equivalents for the pursuit of 
regulatory goals.38 Ricci’s case, involving first agency action and then 
court-based litigation, is a good example of the sort of routine 
overlap in the American regulatory state.39 Securities enforcement 
 
 35. Two other species of process law include evidence law and criminal procedure 
doctrine. See infra note 59. 
 36. LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES, at ix–xi (2d ed. 1931). 
 37. See Brian Leiter, A Potted History of American Legal Education and Scholarship in the 20th-
Century, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Oct. 15, 2012, 6:52 PM), http://leiterlawschool. 
typepad.com/leiter/2012/10/a-potted-history-of-american-legal-education-and-scholarship-in-
the-20th-century-with-special-refere.html. 
 38. Legal economists understand them in this way. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 120–
22 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts), in REGULATION VS. 
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Steven 
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). Policymakers 
often do as well, as when they consciously opt for private litigation instead of bureaucratic 
enforcement for a particular regulatory regime. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 15 (2010). 
 39. About one-third of the non-criminal cases pending in the U.S. Courts of Appeals as of 
October 1, 2010 were direct appeals from administrative agencies. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
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illustrates merger, or instances when public administration proceeds 
as court-based litigation. In FY 2009, for example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission brought 47% of its enforcement actions as 
civil lawsuits,40 pursuant to an organic act that gives the agency total 
discretion to choose between judicial and administrative fora.41 If 
litigation and public administration often relate so closely, then 
there is a good chance that similar problems arise during each 
process, giving rise to similar process law doctrines. The fact that 
these doctrines share a trait as fundamental as trans-substantivity 
seems jurisprudentially-meaningful, not just incidental. 
Third, as I argue in Part III, courts craft a lot of process law, even 
in judicial systems whose judges do not enjoy broad lawmaking 
powers.42 This similarity is important once paired with the fourth 
reason for process law as a proper category for study. All species of 
process law enable decision-makers to affect how legal processes 
realize or interfere with the policy objectives antecedent regimes 
ostensibly serve. What an antecedent regime accomplishes can 
depend, for example, on whether a decision-maker grants class 
certification or uses the avoidance doctrine. Whether and how a 
decision-maker can legitimately adjust the antecedent regime with 
process law may depend on the decision-maker’s identity and its 
relationship with other lawmaking institutions. Courts, for instance, 
manifest anxiety when they use process law explicitly to alter an 
antecedent regime. The absurdity doctrine enables courts to take 
statutory language that does not make sense and construe it to mean 
something that it as a textual matter cannot possibly mean. CAFA’s 
 
COURTS 84 tbl. B-1 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial 
Business/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. Twenty-eight percent of the civil actions filed in 
the U.S District Courts in the year ending September 30, 2010, were classified as civil rights 
actions, prisoner civil rights actions, prison conditions actions, forfeiture actions, immigration 
actions, social security actions, and tax actions, and thus involved a federal agency in one way or 
the other. Id. at 144–46 tbl. C-2. This figure assuredly undercounts the number of cases 
emerging from an agency setting by a significant margin, as it excludes categories of cases that 
do not necessarily involve agencies but often do. These include, for example, cases classified as 
environmental actions and labor law actions, as well as the sizeable number of contract and 
property cases involving the federal government as a litigant in some manner. See id. 
 40. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA, FISCAL 2009, at 3, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf. 
 41. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look 
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 249 (1990). 
 42. Federal courts craft a lot of process law, even as they lack general common-lawmaking 
powers. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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“less,” for example, can mean “more” upon the application of the 
absurdity doctrine.43 Whe courts deploy the doctrine, however, they 
deny that they are rewriting the statute and insist instead that they 
remain faithful to real legislative intent.44  
The opportunities that all varieties of process law create for the 
adjustment of antecedent regimes, and the limits on judicial power 
to use process law accordingly, counsel in favor of a justification for 
trans-substantivity. I describe this justification in Part III, but for the 
moment the relevant claim is that the justification works equally 
well for procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine. 
Fifth, the trans-substantive tendencies in procedural and 
administrative doctrine share parallel histories, as I recount in Part 
II. These histories suggest that the reasons for the principle’s 
manifestation in each species may be similar. A failure to connect 
trans-substantivity in procedural doctrine to trans-substantivity in 
administrative doctrine may result in incomplete understandings of 
the phenomenon and thus only partial critiques of its persistence. 
B. The Trans-Substantivity Spectrum in Process Law 
“Trans-substantivity” is not a new term like “process law,” but it 
also needs elaboration. What counts as a trans-substantive rule of 
process law may lie in the eye of the beholder, as the term gets 
assigned a lot of meanings. The Manual for Complex Litigation is a 
semi-official publication authored by the Federal Judicial Center that 
advises judges on how to handle class actions and other complex 
litigation. Part of the Manual organizes strategies for the 
management of large cases around substantive categories.45 Some 
point to the Manual as evidence of a slide toward substance-
specificity in procedural doctrine.46 But the Manual does not steer 
procedural doctrine into substance-specific enclaves. It has no formal 
authority to establish or alter doctrine. Rather, the Manual suggests 
that nominally trans-substantive rules can lend themselves to 
patterns of application organized around particular antecedent 
 
 43. E.g., Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing cases). 
 44. E.g., State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1209 (Utah 2007). On the absurdity doctrine 
and legislative intent more generally, see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2387, 2400–03 (2003). 
 45. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH 517–724 (2004). 
 46. Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 
1505 (1992) (describing the Manual as “a monument to non-trans-substantivity”). 
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regimes. This tendency may weaken the trans-substantive character 
of federal procedural doctrine. But the Manual differs in kind from 
something like the special pleading standard that applies in 
securities fraud litigation, which formally departs from the trans-
substantive norm in federal procedure. 
Trans-substantivity is a matter of degree, as the following 
diagram indicates: 
 
A process rule is unambiguously substance-specific if a lawmaker 
explicitly designs it with reference to a particular antecedent regime 
and if it only gets used in legal processes that involve that regime. 
Examples are the canon of construction that instructs courts to 
construe exemptions to the antitrust laws narrowly,47 and the 
requirement that administrative law judges issue reasoned decisions 
for social security disability benefit determinations.48 
At one time, the Sixth Circuit required plaintiffs in prison civil 
rights cases plead that they had exhausted administrative remedies 
in their complaints. This requirement is another example of an 
unambiguously substance-specific rule.49 It amounted to an 
elaboration on Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”), the generic federal pleading requirement. One might thus 
characterize the Sixth Circuit’s pleading requirement as a substance-
specific application of a nominally trans-substantive rule. For 
 
 47. E.g., United States v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 411 F.3d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006). 
 49. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). But cf. Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (reversing the Sixth Circuit in another case). 
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prisoners litigating within the Sixth Circuit, however, the exhaustion 
requirement had hardened into the operative pleading standard, in 
effect replacing Rule 8’s nonspecific terms with precise and 
mandatory instructions plaintiffs had to follow upon pain of 
dismissal. 
Contestably substance-specific process law is the next category along 
the spectrum. This category includes doctrine defined by reference to 
a body of law that itself is not process law but is otherwise arguably 
trans-substantive. Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides an example. It regulates appeals in habeas corpus 
cases. If habeas corpus law is a distinct substantive category, then 
Rule 22 is substance-specific. But habeas corpus law may be trans-
substantive, since it involves a variety of antecedent regimes, 
including criminal law and immigration law. If these discrete 
regimes are the relevant substantive categories, then Rule 22 is 
trans-substantive, since it regulates habeas appeals of petitioners 
challenging criminal convictions as well as immigration detention. 
Further along the spectrum is process law that decision-makers 
articulate in trans-substantive terms, but that lends itself to regular 
patterns of application that vary based upon the antecedent regime 
involved. The procedural due process balancing test in Mathews v. 
Eldridge is an example.50 The factors that determine how much 
process is due in particular instances involving a threatened liberty 
or property interest include “the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action” and “the Government’s interest.”51 These 
inputs have no stated connection to any particular antecedent 
regime. But the test generates regularized patterns of results that 
organize themselves around substantive contexts. These results 
readily morph into unambiguously substance-specific doctrine once 
an authoritative decision-maker determines how the test balances 
out for a particular antecedent regime. A tailored rule, not the 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, now determines whether an 
indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding gets a court-
appointed lawyer, because the Supreme Court has addressed this 
situation.52 
 
 50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 51. Id. at 335. 
 52. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). 
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Another example is United States v. Mead Corp., which provides a 
nominally trans-substantive standard to determine which agency 
interpretations of statutes trigger Chevron deference.53 Once an 
authoritative decision-maker decides how Mead applies to a 
particular agency’s interpretation of a particular statute, the decision 
becomes an unambiguously substance-specific rule that controls 
going forward. When a single member of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) writes an unpublished opinion, his or her 
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
presently receives no Chevron deference from the Third Circuit.54 
This substance-specific rule governs within the Third Circuit, not 
because Mead generates the same result every time, but because the 
Third Circuit’s precedent requires it. 
Some nominally trans-substantive rules with routine patterns of 
application resist this move towards unambiguous substance-
specificity. As applied, a type of summary judgment procedure some 
federal district courts use affects employment discrimination cases 
differently than the ordinary run of civil actions.55 But the applicable 
rule is still trans-substantive. Neither the procedure’s terms nor 
authoritative declarations of how it should apply require particular 
treatment of employment discrimination cases. Rather, the manner 
in which the rule interacts with recurring patterns in the litigation of 
employment discrimination cases produces favorable results for 
defendants more often than in other substantive contexts. 
Closer toward the trans-substantivity end of the spectrum lies 
doctrine that is articulated in trans-substantive terms and resists 
substance-specific patterns of application, even though its authors devised 
it for a particular antecedent regime. FRCP 23(b)(2), the provision 
governing class certification in cases for injunctive relief, is one such 
example. The rule’s creators wrote it for school desegregation 
litigation.56 But they codified their intentions in trans-substantive 
 
 53. 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 
 54. De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 55. E.g., Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, at 9–13 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%20
2008/08-CV-145-Comment-Burbank.pdf; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal 
Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 521–22 (2010). 
 56. David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–11 (2011). 
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terms, and since then FRCP 23(b)(2)’s coverage has extended well 
beyond the civil rights context.57 
Doctrine is unambiguously trans-substantive when it has no 
substance-specific origins, gets crafted in trans-substantive terms, 
and does not produce regular patterns of application organized 
around particular antecedent regimes. The requirement that agencies 
publish notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register is one 
such rule. The relation-back doctrine, governing the untimely 
amendment of pleadings, is another. Norms arranging components 
of a bill’s legislative history into a hierarchy of interpretive authority 
is a third. Doctrines remain unambiguously trans-substantive 
because the problems they address rarely arise in regularized 
patterns that vary depending upon the antecedent regime involved. 
There is little reason to think, for example, that antitrust claims by 
their nature lead antitrust plaintiffs to file complaints outside 
limitations periods routinely and thus to require particularized 
applications of the relation-back doctrine. 
As these points along the spectrum indicate, the labels 
“substance-specific” and “trans-substantive” are too blunt. For the 
sake of brevity, I will use these terms, however inadequate, 
throughout this Article. When I refer to “substance-specific” 
doctrine, I include unambiguously substance-specific doctrine and 
nominally trans-substantive doctrine that lends itself to regularized 
patterns of substance-specific application.58 As I argue in Parts III 
and IV, rules that fit in these categories pose a unique set of 
problems to courts as they devise doctrine to regulate legal 
processes.  
II. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY’S ENTRENCHMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
For some species of process law, trans-substantivity has long 
served as a central principle of doctrinal design. This is so for 
evidence law.59 Trans-substantivity’s persistence reflects the long-
 
 57. For an early example, see Nix v. Grand Lodge of the International Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 58. I exclude contestably substance-specific doctrine from my analysis. It poses unique 
complications, because, before one can assess the wisdom of its substance-specificity, one must 
first determine whether the underlying antecedent regime is itself trans-substantive or 
substance-specific. This sort of assessment requires a case-by-case determination and is thus 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 59. D. Michael Risinger, Guilt v. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules For Trying Factual Innocence 
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held belief, voiced prominently by John Henry Wigmore, that “there 
is no occasion” in evidence law “for a distinction” among various 
types of cases. “The relation between an Evidentiary Fact and a 
particular Proposition,” Wigmore argued, “is always the same, 
without regard to the kind of litigation in which that proposition 
becomes material to be proved.”60 The task of evidence law, in other 
words, is inherently trans-substantive.61 Likewise, interpretive 
doctrine also discharges an inherently trans-substantive task, to the 
extent that it provides rules of grammar and usage to help vest the 
incomplete or indeterminate use of language with meaning.62 
 
Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 885, 886 (2008); David A. 
Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can 
Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 728–29 (2006). 
 60. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 4, at 11 (1904). 
 61. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 59, at 731–32. This being said, some evidence law has 
or may splinter into substance-specific strains. E.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and Rethinking of the Application of a Single 
Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1599–1606 (1998). My 
sense is that the pressure on evidence law to do so is less than for procedural and administrative 
doctrine. To the extent that this development proceeds, then my account in Part IV may offer a 
normative metric to evaluate substance-specific evidence law going forward. 
I also exclude criminal procedure from my account of trans-substantivity. It may be trans-
substantive. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7–22 (2011); Stuntz, supra note 12, at 842. 
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1957 n.1 
(2004) (citing sources discussing the issue of substance-specificity in criminal procedure). But I 
am not sure. If “homicide” and “burglary” are the substantive categories, then criminal 
procedure is trans-substantive. If “criminal law,” like “torts” or “contracts,” is the substantive 
category, then criminal procedure is substance-specific. Unlike evidence law, however, if 
criminal procedure is trans-substantive, it likely owes its trans-substantivity to the same set of 
forces that explain the principle in procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine. See 
Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 2–4 
(2012). 
 62. E.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225–90 (1857) 
(summarizing major approaches to statutory interpretation, all of which expressed in trans-
substantive terms). This description of interpretive doctrine’s raison d’être is hardly self-evident. 
Some textualists might think it so. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25–27 (1998) (discussing semantic canons of construction). But 
purposivists might not. To them, interpretive doctrines offer guides to legislative purpose, any 
one of which might be more or less useful in any particular instance. E.g., William S. Blatt, The 
History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 832 
(1985). This understanding of interpretive doctrine is not inherently trans-substantive, and for 
that reason and others, I believe that interpretive doctrine’s trans-substantivity is not as easy to 
explain as, say, evidence law’s trans-substantivity. 
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The reasons for trans-substantivity in procedural and 
administrative doctrine may be less intuitive. For these species, the 
principle has roots that extend into the nineteenth century and, in 
procedure’s case, beyond that. But trans-substantivity’s 
entrenchment in each species as an explicitly-recognized, 
consciously-pursued, and successful principle of doctrinal design 
only happened after the New Deal. I explain this development here 
for two reasons. I mentioned the first in Part I: trans-substantivity’s 
parallel experiences in procedural and administrative settings 
counsel in favor of an explanation of the principle that is not 
narrowly-tailored to civil procedure. In addition, this history 
provides a transition to my discussion of trans-substantivity’s 
present-day justification in Part III. Trans-substantivity’s post-New 
Deal entrenchment had much to do with institutions and their 
limited competences, considerations that an understanding of trans-
substantivity in process law ought to take into account. 
A. Trans-Substantivity’s Ascendancy 
Trans-substantivity emerged in procedural and administrative 
doctrine before the New Deal.63 Efforts to sever the link that 
tethered procedural doctrine to particular common law categories 
began with Jeremy Bentham and culminated with David Dudley 
Field’s trans-substantive code of civil procedure that New York 
adopted in 1848. Field’s achievement proved so influential that his 
code, with its trans-substantive design, won recognition as the 
“American system” of procedure by the end of the nineteenth 
century.64 But civil procedure remained connected to substantive 
categories, even in jurisdictions governed by a version of the Field 
Code, as lawyers clung to the substance-specific doctrine that the 
Code ostensibly replaced.65 Indeed, at the outset of the movement 
 
 63. Jeremy Bentham conceived of procedural law as a stand-alone category, denominated 
“adjective law.” Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 384–85 (describing Bentham’s 
category of “adjective law”). The late 19th century treatise writers followed his lead. E.g., 
WALTER DENTON SMITH, A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY LAW §§ 165–66 (1896) (defining substantive 
and adjective law). On trans-substantivity in administrative law before the New Deal, see JERRY 
L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 16, 309 (2012). 
 64. Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 388–89. 
 65. E.g., CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING 25–26 (1926) (describing the 
persistence of substance-specificity in code pleading); F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS 
OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 295–96 (1913); see also Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 
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that culminated with the FRCP, reformers identified uniformity in 
procedure as a goal to be achieved, not one to be preserved.66 
Administrative law, such as it existed at the dawn of the 
twentieth century,67 had latent trans-substantive tendencies, but 
they remained in the background. Agencies developed for themselves 
“internal laws of administration,” and the varieties of self-regulation 
they devised had similarities from agency-to-agency.68 But the more 
visible doctrine regulating administrative processes, involving 
judicial review of agency action, remained substance-specific. This 
law included, in important part, claims against agency officials 
rooted in common law (and hence substance-specific) causes of 
action.69 
Trans-substantivity became a central principle of doctrinal design 
for both species in the 1930s. The increasing complexity of the 
American legal landscape pressured doctrine in both contexts to 
move in trans-substantive directions, although the principle’s 
political meaning for administrative law initially differed from what 
the principle conveyed for procedure. The FRCP’s trans-substantivity 
reflected a central goal their authors pursued—to minimize 
procedural technicalities and keep the focus of litigation on the 
substantive merits.70 Also, the authors wanted to entrench expert, 
apolitical rulemaking as the preferred mode for procedural reform 
going forward. As I have explained elsewhere, trans-substantivity 
 
392–94. 
 66. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1034–
50 (1982) (recounting this history). 
 67. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 
YALE L.J. 1362, 1375 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Gilded Age] (reporting that nothing was 
published on administrative law “as such” until 1893); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Action – A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 197 (1991) (suggesting that 
after the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 “a separate body of administrative law” began to be 
recognized as “a concept”). 
 68. Mashaw, Gilded Age, supra note 67, at 1466; MASHAW, supra note 63, at 309. 
 69. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 3; Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the 
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 947–953 
(2011); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 407 (2007). 
 70. E.g., Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase – 
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 
976 (1937); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 974 (1987); David Marcus, The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 497 
(2010). 
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strengthened the case for the neutrality of procedural reform, and 
thus the legitimacy of doctrinal development outside political 
arenas.71 The trans-substantivity of New Deal-era procedure also 
made it flexible, a sine qua non for the changing landscape of 
American law. The statute-making of the 1930s, and the 
corresponding shift in the character of civil litigation,72 made an 
adaptive procedural regime essential. Some believed that the 
substance-inflected procedural systems of the past had inhibited the 
evolution of the substantive law,73 a problem uniform rules not 
beholden to any substantive context would solve. 
The growing complexity of the federal regulatory state in the 
1930s deserves direct credit for the emergence of trans-substantivity 
as a central organizational principle for administrative law. Chaotic 
bureaucratic growth convinced everyone from Franklin Roosevelt to 
his political adversaries that administrative governance required 
some kind of standardization.74 Roosevelt’s suggestion, a 
reorganization of agencies under a single chain of command leading 
 
 71. Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 397–98; see also Robert G. Bone, Making 
Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (2008). 
 72. E.g., Lawrence Baum et al., The Evolution of Litigation in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
1895–1975, 16 LAW & SOC. REV. 291, 301 (1981); Wolf Hydebrand, Government Litigation and 
National Policymaking, 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 477, 482–83 (1990). 
 73. E.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 300 (1938) 
(fearing that the “undue rigidity” of prior procedural regimes would interfere with “a developing 
substantive law”); see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 70, at 973–74; 
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations on Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One 
Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2010). Cf. Emily Sherwin, The 
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 78–86 (2008); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989) (“Formulation of new theories of legal rights is 
simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old 
legal categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading.”). 
 74. Compare Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 789, 
795 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 A.B.A. Report] (lamenting “the absence of any order or system in 
the organization and functioning of the several departments, independent establishments, 
boards, commissions, government-owned corporations, and other agencies”), and Report of the 
Special Committee on Administrative Law, 56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 407, 415 (1933), with Reorganization 
of the Executive Departments: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on 
Reorganization of the Executive Departments of the Government, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 12, 1937, 
at 2 (complaining that “[t]here are over 100 separate departments, boards, commissions, 
corporations, authorities, agencies, and activities through which the work of the Government is 
being carried on,” and insisting that “[n]either the President nor the Congress can exercise 
effective supervision and direction over such a chaos of establishments”) [hereinafter 
“Reorganization Message”]. 
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directly to him,75 left conservatives apoplectic.76 To simplify the 
story, conservatives responded with draft legislation, dubbed the 
Walter-Logan Bill, that proposed a uniform set of highly 
cumbersome procedural requirements on all New Deal agency 
activities.77 FDR vetoed it in December 1940. He perceived the effort 
as an attempt to enchain the New Deal in procedural shackles, a 
reaction justified by the fact that the bill exempted most agencies 
that antedated the New Deal from its coverage.78 Roosevelt may not 
have had a problem with trans-substantivity for administrative 
governance per se, just the rigid requirements the Walter-Logan Bill 
contemplated. Identifying a connection between procedural and 
administrative reform that others would recognize later, Roosevelt 
compared the Walter-Logan Bill disfavorably with the trans-
substantive FRCP, one of the “most significant and useful trends of 
the twentieth century in legal administration.”79 
 
 
 75. Reorganization Message, supra note 74, at 3. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, The 
Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 93–106 
(2004). 
 76. Dictatorship Plan Charged, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1938, at 5 (quoting Sen. Pinchot) 
(describing Roosevelt’s plan as an attempt to “transform[] the government into a dictatorship”); 
House Votes Veto Power Into Reorganization Bill, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 8, 1938, at 1, 7 (quoting a 
House opponent to the plan, who called it “‘an escalator to a dictatorship’”); George B. 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1585 (1996). 
 77. 1937 A.B.A. Report, supra note 74, at 814; Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of 
Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 271–73 (1978). 
 78. Verkuil, supra note 75, at 273 (explaining the anti-New Deal motivations of 
supporters of the Walter-Logan bill); Shepherd, supra note 76, at 1580; James Landis, Crucial 
Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1940); see also Letter from Robert H. 
Jackson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, to the President, Dec. 11, 1940, 86 
Cong. Rec. 13943, 13944 (Dec. 18, 1940) (arguing that uniformity in the regulation of public 
administration “was as if we should average the sizes of all men’s feet and then buy shoes of 
only that one size for the Army”). Trans-substantivity in administrative procedure retained this 
partisan valence in the famed 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure. On the political leanings and background of committee members, see 
Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. 
POL’Y HIST. 379, 388 (2008). 
 79. Message from the President to the U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 1940, 86 
Cong. Rec. 13942, 13942. See also Robert H. Jackson, The Problem of the Administrative Process, 29 
WIS. ST. BAR ASS’N REP. 155 (1939) (contrasting “court procedure” with the administrative 
process). 
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B. Trans-Substantivity’s Entrenchment 
Trans-substantivity grew entrenched for procedural and 
administrative doctrine after the war. As Henry Hart and Herbert 
Wechsler observed in 1953, “uniformity as a general principle has 
. . . won the day throughout the field of federal procedure.”80 The 
creeping substance-specificity that had plagued the Field Code did 
not similarly distort the FRCP regime. During the 1940s and 1950s, 
a modest threat came from complex antitrust cases. Some district 
judges believed that this litigation suffered from particular 
dysfunctions, and that procedural rules tailor-made for antitrust 
claims could respond.81 But the courts of appeals quelled the 
rebellion.82 The Federal Rules “adopted a uniform system for all 
cases,” Charles Clark wrote for the Second Circuit in 1957.83 As he 
elaborated off the bench, “[i]t is neither right nor dignified for 
[judges] to erode what the Congress has granted,” by erecting 
procedural barriers that would interfere with the realization of the 
policy objectives of the antitrust laws.84 
After World War II interrupted progress on the reform of 
administrative governance, Congress, by a unanimous vote, passed 
the trans-substantive APA in 1946.85 The APA created some 
 
 80. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 589 (1953). 
 81. New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206 
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”, 21 F.R.D. 45, 50 n.8 
(1957) (citing similar cases). On the dysfunctions, see Archie O. Dawson, The Place of the 
Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the “Big Case”, 23 F.R.D. 430, 431 (1958). 
 82. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1957); Package Closure Corp. v. 
Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1944); La. Farmers’ Protective Union, Inc. v. Great 
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. of America, Inc., 131 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1942); see also United States v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 7 F.R.D. 338, 340 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
 83. Nagler, 248 F.2d at 323. 
 84. Charles E. Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson’s Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a 
Proper Definition of the Issues in the “Big Case”, 23 F.R.D. 435, 439 (1958); see also Clark, Special 
Pleading, supra note 81, at 50 (insisting that “it is not for us to fight Congressional policy” with 
particularized procedure). 
 85. The political meaning of the APA’s enactment is contested, and its unanimous 
enactment may not reflect a bipartisan embrace of trans-substantivity in administrative law. For 
contrasting interpretations of the politics of the APA’s enactment, compare James E. Brazier, An 
Anti-New Dealer Legacy: The Administrative Procedure Act, 8 J. POL’Y HIST. 206 (1996), with 
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 
189–95 (1999). Contemporaries seemed to think that the idea of uniformity had won broad 
acceptance by the time of the APA’s passage. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its 
Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1390, 1391 (1955). 
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innovations for administrative law but mostly codified a set of best 
practices that agencies had developed for themselves.86 It imposed 
only “minimal procedural essentials,” in the words of one of its chief 
sponsors,87 and hardly the burdensome requirements that the 
Walter-Logan Bill contemplated.88 
Still, the APA and the trans-substantive regime it created were 
significant. For one thing, contemporaries understood the APA’s 
trans-substantivity to prioritize a value of what I call “generality.” 
This value stands for the notion that legal processes should not 
target particular entities or persons for idiosyncratic treatment. In a 
number of instances after the APA’s enactment, Congress legislated 
particular requirements for specific agencies.89 Opponents of this 
specialized treatment invoked the APA’s trans-substantivity, as 
modeling a generality value, to support their resistance.90 These 
opponents argued that the APA was supposed to ensure that all 
agency processes remain yoked to general rules articulated in 
advance, to keep government officials from ruling by fiat, and to 
 
 86. JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE 
THE NEW DEAL 77–82 (2012). 
 87. Verkuil, supra note 77, at 277 n. 101 (quoting Sen. Pat McCarran). 
 88. GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 77–82. 
 89. E.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Committee on Judicial Review, 
Special Statutory Provisions Governing Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Proceedings, Part I – 
Executive Departments (Aug. 1962); S. Rep. No. 83-111 (1953) (describing various statutes 
exempting particular agency processes from the APA). E.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 
305–10 (1955) (describing Congress’s response to a decision subjecting immigration 
adjudication to the APA). 
 90. E.g., Report of the Committee on Improvement of Administrative Procedure, 12 ADMIN. L. 
BULL. 254, 254 (1960); President’s Conference on Administrative Procedure, 14 FED. COMM. B.J. 15, 
15 (1955); COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK 
FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 23, 32, 40–41 (Mar. 1955) (Hoover 
Commission Report) (counseling against exemptions from the APA and arguing in favor of 
uniform rules for administrative procedure); Alexander Wiley, Administrative Law: Further 
Improvements in Agency Procedure, 34 A.B.A. J. 877, 879–80 (1948) (argument by Chairman of U.S 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in favor of uniform rules of agency procedure modeled on the 
Federal Rules); Aitchison on Uniform Rules, 1 ADMIN. L. BULL. 41 (1949); Pat McCarran, Total 
Justice and Administrative Procedure, 1 ADMIN. L. BULL. 15, 21 (1949); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 
Administrative Procedure: Shall Rules Before Agencies Be Uniform?, 34 A.B.A. J. 896 (1948). For 
doubts about the wisdom of generality in administrative law, see, 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.02, at 515–20 (1958); George T. Washington, Are Uniform 
Rules of Procedure Practicable?, 34 A.B.A. J. 1011 (1948); Committee on Administrative Law, 
Report on the Question of Uniform Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, With Specific Reference 
to the McCarran Bill, S. 527 of the 81st Congress, 4 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 244, 244 (1949). 
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depoliticize the governance of public administration.91 This concern 
for generality motivated several nearly successful efforts to create a 
rulemaking process for administrative procedure modeled on the 
rulemaking process for the FRCP, one that would have strengthened 
the trans-substantive character of administrative law even further.92 
Trans-substantivity exerted significant influence on the post-war 
evolution of administrative law in the courts, in ways that 
underscored the identification of trans-substantivity with this value 
of generality.93 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,94 which the Supreme 
Court decided in 1950, is the best example. The Court invoked the 
APA’s “purpose” of “greater uniformity of procedure and 
standardization of administrative practice” to justify a presumption 
that the APA governed an agency’s processes absent a clear 
statement from Congress otherwise.95 The Wong Yang Sung court 
held that the APA’s separation-of-functions requirement applied to 
deportation proceedings, such that immigration officials responsible 
for initiating these proceedings could not also adjudicate them.96 
The Court denounced how the agency had conflated these roles. In 
so doing, it identified generality in administrative governance with 
protection against governmental action targeting a politically 
vulnerable group.97 The Court quickly extended this preference for 
generality to other administrative contexts.98 
 
 91. GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 108. 
 92. Kenneth Culp Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action, 
109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (1961) (commenting on the Eisenhower Administration’s 
establishment of an Office of Administrative Procedure, created in part to recommend uniform 
procedural rules when possible); S. Rep. No. 83-1953, at 2–3 (1954); Uniform Rules, 7 ADMIN. L. 
BULL. 28, 32 (1954) (noting bill’s passage by the Senate); S. Rep. No. 82-403 (1951); Activities of 
Sections and Committees, 37 A.B.A. J. 699, 699 (1951) (noting the bill’s passage by the Senate). Pat 
McCarran had proposed similar legislation in 1949. McCarran Bill for Uniform Rules, 1 ADMIN. L. 
BULL. 23 (1949). Others would propose similar legislation in 1960. Report of the Committee on 
Improvement of Administrative Procedure, 12 ADMIN. L. BULL. 254, 254 (1960). On the motives for 
this legislation, see GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 215. 
 93. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951); United States v. 
Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293, 294 (D. Conn. 1949). Cf. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 238 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 94. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 95. Id. at 41. 
 96. Id. at 44–45. 
 97. Id. at 46. 
 98. E.g., Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per curiam) (reversing a 
decision holding that the APA applied to certain proceedings within the Interstate Commerce 
Commission); Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (per curiam) (1951) (reversing a decision 
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Several factors may have contributed to trans-substantivity’s 
post-war entrenchment in both species of doctrine. The first is 
straightforward. The increased complexity of American law may have 
required a set of trans-substantive defaults for the regulation of 
litigation and public administration. During the 1930s and 
afterward, lawmakers simply could not fashion substance-specific 
process law fast enough. Second, trans-substantivity, which had no 
partisan valence for New Deal-era procedure, shed some of its 
ideological freight by 1950 or so for administrative law. Generality as 
a commitment in administrative governance probably began to 
appeal more to New Dealers by the late 1940s. Their grip on the 
levers of the federal bureaucracy weakened, and they could count on 
having less direct legislative control over agency processes going 
forward.99 It makes sense that New Dealers would want some 
baseline procedural constraint on agencies once they lost control of 
the agencies themselves. 
Third, trans-substantivity as a design principle neatly reflected a 
more basic commitment steering the evolution of administrative law 
and civil procedure during and after the war. Lawmakers trying to 
reform process law can abide by a trans-substantivity norm if they 
believe that that court-based litigation or public administration can 
improve without explicit reference to the particular substantive 
results that these processes generate. This faith in process lurked as 
an unstated premise of post-New Deal administrative law. Doctrine 
of this era permitted courts to regulate administrative procedure, but 
it did not authorize them to meddle with the substance of agency 
decision-making.100 One of the FRCP’s chief normative 
 
denying that the APA applied to certain proceedings conducted by the Postmaster General). See 
generally William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
881, 885–88 (2006). 
 99. McNollgast, supra note 85, at 189–95. 
 100. For a representative case, where the Court denies that it can question the substance 
of the agency’s decision, but where it nonetheless remands with instructions to the agency that 
it compile a better record, see, for example, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 
(1941); see also Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942) (denying judicial power 
to question the substantive wisdom of agency policymaking, but insisting that courts retain the 
power to stay the enforcement of an order pending appeal); see generally Estep v. United States, 
327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Reuel Schiller, “St. George and the Dragon”: 
Courts and the Development of the Administrative State in Twentieth Century America, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 
110, 118 (2005); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review of Procedural Decisions and the Philco Cases: Plus ÇA 
Change?, 50 GEO. L.J. 661, 663 (1962); Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1942–
1951, 51 MICH. L. REV. 775, 862 (1953). 
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commitments was similar: judges can regulate procedure to improve 
litigation, but they should not let procedural rules disrupt the 
operation of the substantive law.101 
Finally, legal process jurisprudence, which dominated American 
legal thought after the war, created a fertile intellectual environment 
for trans-substantivity’s entrenchment. The principle offered a 
shorthand of sorts for process theory’s particular emphasis on 
institutional competence and procedural quality.102 Insofar as the 
principle conveyed the idea that judges could meaningfully supervise 
agency processes without control over the substance of public 
administration, trans-substantivity mirrored the legal process 
preference.103 Courts are ill-equipped to question agencies’ 
regulatory choices, some process theorists believed.104 But 
administrative legitimacy depends upon the quality of agency 
decision-making processes, something judicial oversight could 
ensure.105 
In litigation, ad hoc, consequentialist decision-making of the sort 
that might generate a particular procedural rule for antitrust 
litigation undermined adjudicative legitimacy.106 As Lon Fuller 
explained in a passage reproduced in The Legal Process materials, 
“[a]djudication can be effective only when it is attended by that 
minimum, formal rationality which demands a like treatment of like 
cases. But the like treatment of like cases presupposes some general 
principle or standard by which ‘like cases’ and ‘like treatment’ can be 
 
 101. E.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957); see also id. at 323. 
 102. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 953, 962 (1994) (describing institutional competence focus); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW, at li, xciv (1994). 
 103. See generally Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 567, 579 (1992) (“[T]he passage from the New Deal revolution to the legal process 
counterrevolution is marked by the preoccupation in the late 1930s and 1940s with regularizing 
agency decision making procedures.”). 
 104. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 400 
(1978). See also HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 399–400 (excerpting Fuller’s article and 
quoting his insistence that “adjudication cannot be used to decide . . . questions . . . that may 
be said generally to have a ‘managerial’ quality”). 
 105. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129–30 (1954). 
 106. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959). 
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defined.”107 Trans-substantive procedural rules could ensure that 
“principles of decision applicable not only to the case in hand but to 
other like cases” drove judicial decision-making.108 The quality of 
the litigation process, not particular substantive results, should 
matter to the application of procedural doctrine.109 
This history provides two final lessons. The first is obvious, 
made all the more so by the examples of substance-specificity in 
process law that appear throughout this Article. Trans-substantivity 
is not in the very nature of procedural and administrative doctrine. 
Its entrenchment resulted from an evolutionary process punctuated 
in significant measure by the New Deal and its aftermath. Second, 
reflecting legal process jurisprudence that the principle mirrored so 
well after the war,110 trans-substantivity has to do with the proper 
allocation of decision-making power among government institutions 
based on their respective competencies. This premise provides the 
foundation for my justification of trans-substantivity as a principle of 
doctrinal design. 
III. A JUSTIFICATION FOR TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY IN PROCESS LAW 
Plenty of process law is not trans-substantive. Specialized 
requirements govern rulemaking by the U.S. Treasury,111 plaintiffs 
in medical malpractice cases often must meet particularized 
procedural requirements,112 and immigrants litigating their status 
under the INA may benefit from an interpretive presumption in their 
favor.113 State and federal systems direct entire categories of 
litigation, such as bankruptcy, probate, and family law, into 
substance-specific silos for processing. For decades, commentators 
have cited this sort of particularized doctrine to question whether 
 
 107. Fuller, quoted in HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 399; see also Kent Greenawalt, The 
Enduring Significance of the Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 985–89 (1978) (elaborating 
on the neutral principles idea). 
 108. HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 642. 
 109. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 512–13 (1954). 
 110. For a summary of central tenets of legal process theory, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS 
OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 233 (1995). 
 111. E.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1727, 1735–40 (2007). 
 112. See Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 407–10. 
 113. E.g., Navarro v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/25/2014 1:26 PM 
1191 Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law 
 1219 
trans-substantivity remains a central principle of doctrinal design for 
process law.114 
Yet significant swaths of process law remain trans-
substantive.115 Some of it is unambiguously so. Other doctrine is 
nominally trans-substantive, while lending itself to regularized 
patterns of substance-specific application. Even for this latter 
category, decision-makers invoke trans-substantivity with some 
frequency to keep doctrine from sliding toward the substance-
specific end of the spectrum. The principle’s considerable, if not 
overwhelming,116 force as a constraint on procedural doctrine is 
 
 114. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 90–94 (2010); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 600 (2005); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in 
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and 
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 
2048–51 (1989); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 499 (2011); Note, Comparative Domestic Constitutionalism: Rethinking Criminal Procedure Using 
the Administrative Constitution, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2530, 2533–35 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Of 
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
693, 715 (1988). 
 115. A datum often invoked as a sign of disappearing trans-substantivity in civil procedure 
is Congress’s decision to legislate specific procedures for prison litigation. E.g., JUDITH RESNIK & 
NANCY S. MARDER, SUGGESTIONS FOR AND REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING ADJUDICATION AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 2 (2004) (“The trans-substantive premise of 
the civil rules has been rejected through amendments made by the judiciary and by 
CongressFalse. Today, national legislation, local rulemaking, and private contracting impose 
different litigating requirements for certain kinds of disputes, [including] litigation about prison 
conditions.”); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1562–63 (2003). 
While this legislation did indeed create particularized procedures for some stages of a prison 
lawsuit, it left a host of issues—the pleading standard, the legal threshold for a court’s personal 
jurisdiction, and the nature of the inquiry at the summary judgment stage, to name a few—
unchanged. For trans-substantive rules regulating prison litigation in the wake of the PLRA, see, 
for example, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (pleading); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 
1210, 1217–22 (10th Cir. 2010) (personal jurisdiction); Murray v. Edwards Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 
453 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284–85 (D. Kan. 2006) (summary judgment). Another ostensible signal 
of disappearing trans-substantivity is the devolution of authority to ninety-four federal districts 
to craft local rules, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1501, 1504–05 (1992); RESNIK & MARDER, supra note 115, at 2. But evidence of extensive 
substance-specificity in local rules is not extensive, e.g., Joshua M. Koppel, Comment, Tailoring 
Discovery: Using Nontranssubstantive Rules To Reduce Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 266 
(2012); Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 427–28. 
 116. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (insisting that courts take a “flexible 
approach” to Rule 60(b)(5) motions addressing institutional reform decrees); Catherine Y. Kim, 
Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform 
Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (draft at 42). 
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evident,117 and “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach” 
likewise steers the evolution of administrative law.118 
Unless the many departures from the trans-substantive norm are 
uniformly unwise, legal processes may sometimes proceed better if 
regulated by substance-specific rules. Does trans-substantivity enjoy 
any general justification, or does the choice between a particular 
trans-substantive rule and a substance-specific alternative depend on 
context-specific variables? The answer depends on the institution 
involved in the law’s generation and maintenance. For court-made 
process doctrine, a general justification for trans-substantivity in 
doctrinal design exists. Courts suffer from institutional limitations 
that have to do with their legitimacy, competency, and effectiveness 
as lawmakers. Trans-substantivity ameliorates these deficits and 
thereby helps improve the process law courts create and administer. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Trans-Substantivity 
Trans-substantivity serves several important values. Generality is 
one, as the history recounted in Part II suggests. The refusal to 
discriminate among different antecedent regimes means that 
regimes’ beneficiaries get treated as objects of equal concern by the 
processes of American law. Adjudication, for example, proceeds 
pursuant to the same set of rules for individuals alleging routine tort 
claims as for corporations litigating huge commercial claims. As a 
guarantor of generality, trans-substantivity can protect process law 
against distortion otherwise produced by outsized political influence, 
 
 117. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009); Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 
F. Supp. 2d 893, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–
60 (2011) (rejecting a decades-old Title VII-specific application of Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 118. Mayo Found. for Medical Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011) (internal quotations omitted); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999); Vill. of 
Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a proposed 
exemption from Chevron deference for interpretations proffered by a particular agency); Cohen v. 
United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a tax-specific standard for the 
review of agency inaction); Dir. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dept. of Labor v. 
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1994); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 
(1950). For similar sentiments expressed in the interpretation of state versions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, see, for example, Dept. of Educ. v. Kitchens, 387 S.E.2d 579, 580 
(Ga. App. 1989); Rogue Flyfishers, Inc. v. Water Policy Review Bd., 62 Or. App. 412, 414 n.1 
(1983); Trask v. Johnson, 452 P.2d 575, 578 (Ok. 1969). See generally In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 
1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or 
Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89, 93 (2010) (commenting on the rise and fall of a tax-
specific deference standard). 
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capture, or bias. Also, trans-substantive doctrine can lower the 
barriers to entry for areas of practice. General rules mean fewer 
advantages for legal specialists. Trans-substantivity thus helps to 
enable generalist lawyers to practice in a wider array of contexts. 
But trans-substantivity is not “sacred.”119 Sometimes equal 
treatment of legal processes involving different antecedent regimes 
makes little sense, especially when antecedent regimes involve 
particular policy problems that specially-tailored process law might 
address. In such instances, an unyielding commitment to trans-
substantivity can impose costs. Sometimes substance-specific 
process law gives lawmakers a nuanced way to adjust the regulatory 
effect of a particular antecedent regime. Instead of ending or 
restricting liability for insurance companies under a consumer 
protection law, for example, a state might instead decide to limit 
their exposure to class action lawsuits.120 If trans-substantivity 
required the class action rule to remain indifferent to substantive 
context, lawmakers could not use this procedural avenue to achieve 
the desired regulatory effect. 
Substance-specific doctrines may also respond to dysfunctions 
from which legal processes involving particular antecedent regimes 
tend to suffer. If lawmakers cannot depart from the trans-substantive 
norm to address these dysfunctions, they must either let these 
dysfunctions fester, or they must remedy them with an over-
inclusive trans-substantive response that applies unnecessarily to 
processes involving other antecedent regimes. The Supreme Court’s 
recent forays into pleading doctrine are a good example. The Court 
first raised the federal pleading standard in an antitrust case,121 a 
move with some logic behind it. In certain instances, firm behavior 
in competitive markets that smacks of conspiracy can just as likely 
result from innocent activity.122 The new pleading standard ensures 
that antitrust plaintiffs cannot get to discovery, and thereby impose 
significant litigation costs on defendants, with allegations that do no 
more than describe legitimate self-interested conduct. But the 
commitment to trans-substantivity in federal pleading law is 
 
 119. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 399, 409 n.56 (2011). 
 120. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 444 
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing legislation in New York to this effect). 
 121. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
 122. Id. at 554. 
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uncompromising.123 The Court’s decision to extend the heightened 
pleading standard to civil rights cases came as a foregone 
conclusion,124 even though the particular rationale for heightened 
pleading in antitrust litigation does not obtain elsewhere. 
This mix of costs and benefits would seem to preclude any 
generalized justification for trans-substantivity. Maybe a decision-
maker contemplating a deviation from the trans-substantive norm 
for a particular problem of process law can only decide wisely if she 
undertakes a contextualized assessment of the principle’s costs and 
benefits. Such an assessment would include an empirical 
measurement of results with the trans-substantive rule, a normative 
evaluation of those results, an empirical estimate of the likely 
outcomes with a substance-specific rule, and a determination of their 
normative significance. 
B. The Judiciary and Process Law 
This doubt, that a general justification for trans-substantivity 
exists, assumes that the decision-maker has the capacity to make a 
good contextualized assessment of the sort I just described. But 
courts do not. They suffer from a set of institutional limitations that 
can disable them from legitimately, competently, and effectively 
designing substance-specific process law to correct for dysfunctions, 
or to fine-tune the regulatory effect of a particular antecedent 
regime. Trans-substantivity, as a response to these deficits, thus 
enjoys a general justification for judge-made process law. Because 
courts fashion a lot of process law, this institutional justification 
supports the persistence of trans-substantivity as a central principle 
for doctrinal design.  
1. Judicial Upkeep of Process Law 
Congress creates a lot of administrative law, as statutes ranging 
from the trans-substantive (the APA, the Federal Register Act, and 
so on)125 to the subject-specific (the Veterans Benefits Improvement 
 
 123. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 549. 
 124. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 125. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, at vii–xv 
(4th ed. 2008) (listing statutes); Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal 
Administrative Rulemakings, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 536 (2000). 
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Act)126 illustrate. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which established 
the institutional framework for procedural rulemaking, similarly 
reflects Congress’s involvement in the creation of civil procedure 
doctrine. State legislatures have enacted a multitude of interpretive 
instructions.127 
Nonetheless, courts or court-supervised actors generate a lot of 
process law. Statutes formally govern forum regulation for civil 
litigation, and the U.S. Constitution sets baselines for acceptable 
procedure. But the weight of procedural doctrine comes from court-
supervised rulemakers or in judicial opinions.128 Even the law of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction, which requires a statutory 
anchor, often in reality flows from a judicial tap.129 As for 
interpretive doctrine, only recently have scholars begun to question 
the judiciary’s primary role in its generation,130 and even to treat 
positively-enacted interpretive instructions as worthy of study.131 
 
 126. 38 U.S.C. § 5121A(a)(1) (regulating the substitution of parties after a veteran’s 
death); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (specifying particular requirements for EPA notice-and-comment 
rulemaking); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 et seq. (regulations crafted by the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review for the conduct of immigration hearings). 
 127. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 
(2010); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus 
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as 
Labratories]. 
 128. On procedural doctrine in state systems, see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The 
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 
1367, 1431 (1986); see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. 
L.J. 354 (2003). 
 129. Until 1990, the law of supplemental jurisdiction was entirely judge-made, 
notwithstanding the general understanding that Congress had to act to create subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 
76 VA. L. REV. 539, 546 (1990); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An 
Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 35–41 (1992). 
When the Supreme Court devised its test for when state law claims that depend in significant 
measure on a federal legal issue arise under federal law for the purposes of federal question 
jurisdiction, it did not bother interpreting the federal question jurisdiction statute to do so. See 
generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Engineering, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 130. E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2079, 2086 (2002) (“The central, unquestioned premise in [the] field [of statutory 
interpretation] is that the judiciary is the proper branch to design and implement tools of 
statutory interpretation.”); id. at 2088–89 (“[S]tatutory interpretation was long assumed the 
exclusive province of the judiciary.”). 
 131. E.g., Scott, supra note 127, at 341; Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 127, at 
1750; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Justice Scalia’s Living Textualism and Our Normative Canons, __ 
COLUM. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 33–34) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (commenting on 
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The orthodox view is that administrative law lies predominantly in 
judge-made doctrine.132 To be sure, various rules have a statutory 
“hook,” but their content hardly comes from the text of a statute like 
the APA through a process one could defensibly describe as statutory 
interpretation.133 Challenges to this perception of judicial 
dominance have surfaced,134 and a web of positively-enacted 
instructions govern various administrative processes. Still, whatever 
becomes of the orthodox view, judges in fact continue to devise and 
superintend significant and core components of administrative 
law.135 
Judicial responsibility for a lot of process law probably results 
from institutional limitations that interfere with lawmaking activity 
by coordinate branches. Often legislatures lack interest in procedural 
technicalities,136 although the importance of process law to the 
effective implementation of antecedent regimes is hardly a mystery. 
This general awareness, that process law holds great power over the 
realization of policy objectives, makes all the more notable the 
 
Scalia’s lack of attention to legislated instructions). 
 132. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2012); Jack M. Beerman, Common Law and Statute Law in 
Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in 
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 115 (1999); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common 
Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3–4. See generally MASHAW, supra 
note 63, at 289 (describing “[t]he twenty-first century model” of administrative law as one 
“whose sources are found almost exclusively in general principles derived from judicial review; 
from trans-substantive statutes that apply to most, if not all, agencies; and, to a much lesser 
extent, from judicial construction of the Constitution”). 
 133. Metzger, supra note 132, at 1299. For an example, see United States v. Nova Scotia 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977); see also American Radio Relay League, 
Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanagh, J., concurring) (insisting that the 
Nova Scotia obligation, ostensibly derived from APA § 553, that agencies disclose the data they 
base their rules on “cannot be squared with the text of . . . the APA”). 
 134. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 285–316; Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009); Mashaw, Gilded Age, supra note 67, at 1470. 
 135. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical 
Stories of Legal Development, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 290 (1990) [hereinafter Mashaw, Explaining 
Administrative Process] (“It seems virtually undeniable that the major procedural developments in 
American administrative law . . . have been the work largely of the courts or of the Chief 
Executive.”). 
 136. The hyper-technical Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, for example, got 
stuck in a five-year holding pattern because, as the House Committee Report recounts, the 
House Judiciary Committee “did not have time” to focus on details of federal forum regulation. 
H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 2 (2011); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: 
Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1224–25 (1996) 
(commenting on legislative indifference to procedural reform in past years). 
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legislative tendency to delegate process law to courts. Legislatures 
routinely use a narrow range of devices, like fee-shifting provisions, 
to affect the legal process for a particular antecedent regime,137 but 
they eschew many others. Congress, for example, hardly ever 
specifies whether or how a bill’s legislative history can be used in 
interpretation.138 
Legislative dynamics, in particular the gauntlet of vetogates a bill 
must run, might explain this phenomenon.139 General statutes like 
the APA or CAFA that aim to transform significantly the governance 
of a legal process have encountered great resistance.140 Congress can 
always include specialized instructions for a particular antecedent 
regime in the bill establishing or amending the regime itself, but 
doing so would significantly multiply the points of possible 
disagreement and thus the prospect of legislative sclerosis. A 
supporter of the bill might, for this reason, leave process details out. 
Congress can also enact procedural, administrative, and 
interpretive rules after an antecedent regime’s creation, as it did 
when it crafted the pleading threshold for securities litigation in 
1995, or when it prescribed rulemaking requirements for the Federal 
Trade Commission in 1974.141 These sorts of interventions are not 
common,142 presumably for the reasons just mentioned. Moreover, 
 
 137. On the efficacy of fee-shifting provisions to amplify the regulatory force of an 
antecedent regime, see Sean Farhang & Douglas M. Spencer, Economic Incentives For Attorney 
Representation in Civil Rights Litigation (unpublished draft, Sept. 10, 2012). 
 138. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 instructs courts that they cannot consider anything other 
than a particular memorandum as legislative history usable in interpretation. Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 107 (1991). As far as I can tell, this limit is singular. Two sophisticated 
treatments of legislated instructions identify this one and none other. Linda D. Jellum, “Which is 
to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 837, 852 (2009); Rosenkranz, supra note 130, at 2109–10. Congress’s process law-
interventions for litigation are mostly fee-shifting provisions. See generally Sean Farhang, 
Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–7 (2009) (discussing these devices); Margaret H. Lemos, Special 
Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 790–94 (2011) (discussing these devices). 
 139. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1444–48 (2008). On relevant legislative dynamics generally, see generally Daniel J. 
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 386–95. 
 140. On the APA’s tortured history, see generally Shepherd, supra note 76. CAFA took 
eight years to get passed. See Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year 
Saga is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 386–88 (2005). 
 141. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2183 (1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. §41). 
 142. E.g., Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process, supra note 135, at 280 (“Yet these 
detailed and process-specific incursions into administrative process seemed dwarfed by the 
degree to which the Congress acts generically and leaves the crucial details of procedural 
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the iterative dynamics of lawmaking might incentivize legislators to 
leave process alone as a general practice. Were a legislature regularly 
to enact ideologically-inflected process law, the practice might 
redound to complicate efforts to get antecedent regimes passed 
going forward. A sponsor offering an amendment to weaken a 
proposed statutory regime might have less credibility to a fence-
sitter if the fence-sitter thought the sponsor would subsequently 
seek some specialized process rule to compensate for the 
amendment. 
Congress has often delegated the authority to regulate aspects of 
their processes to agencies.143 But agencies cannot legitimately 
control certain issues of administrative law, particularly those 
involving judicial review of agency action.144 The specter of self-
dealing would loom were agencies to promulgate rules to govern the 
judicial interpretation of statutes they administer,145 or to supply 
procedural rules for cases they might litigate.146 
Judicial responsibility for a lot of process law might also result 
from a protective sense of institutional prerogative. Process law’s 
generation and maintenance may often end up in the courts by 
default. But even if legislators busied themselves with process law 
more often, or if agencies could legitimately promulgate more of this 
law, courts might resist such encroachments onto their territory. No 
procedural law fits more unambiguously in Congress’s bailiwick than 
forum regulation. Even when Congress addresses a venue issue by 
statute, however, judges have continued to devise and use their own 
doctrine.147 Abbe Gluck has documented judicial resistance to 
 
implementation to agencies, courts, and perhaps the President.”). 
 143. F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1940); Vt. Yankee Nuclear 
Power v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978). 
 144. E.g., William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 251 (2009) (arguing that courts should not extend Chevron deference to 
agency interpretations of the part of the APA instructing them when they must hold formal 
hearings). 
 145. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural 
Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 589–92 (2007). 
 146. Cf. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(refusing to allow the NLRB to use an agency-devised procedure to immunize a decision from 
review). 
 147. The best example is forum non conveniens. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract 
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 
1010–11 (2008); see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Reconsidered, 79 NOTRE 
DO NOT DELETE 2/25/2014 1:26 PM 
1191 Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law 
 1227 
legislative attempts to prescribe interpretive rules.148 In Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, the Supreme Court purportedly 
constrained the authority of the federal courts to develop a common 
law of administrative procedure.149 But the federal courts continue 
to do so, Vermont Yankee notwithstanding.150 
2. Trans-substantivity in judge-made process law 
A justification for trans-substantivity as a principle of doctrinal 
design lurks in the fact that judges make a lot of process law. To 
some extent, the principle might reflect formal limits on courts’ 
lawmaking authority. The Enabling Act prohibits rules that “abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”151 This constraint has not 
only steered rulemakers away from substance-specific proposals,152 
it also has generated a canon that counsels against substance-
specificity in rule interpretation.153 But this understanding of the 
Enabling Act’s meaning is not necessarily correct.154 Moreover, in 
other process law contexts, formal restrictions on substance-
specificity are weaker or nonexistent. Interpretive doctrine rarely 
flows from a statutory source. The APA applies as a default unless 
Congress provides otherwise,155 but the statute does not address a 
number of core issues in administrative law.156 
 
DAME L. REV. 1891, 1893 (2004); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
543, 545–61 (1985). 
 148. Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 127, at 1824–27; Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal 
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 758 
(2013) (“But when it comes to statutory interpretation, federal judges seem particularly 
unwilling to relinquish—either to other federal courts, to state courts, or to legislatures—any 
power to dictate what rules of interpretation must be applied.”). 
 149. 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978); see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 
502, 513–16 (2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990); 
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. 
REV. 345, 390. 
 150. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
856, 882–900 (2007); see generally Metzger, supra note 132, at 1331. 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 152. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542–43. 
 153. David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 968. 
 154. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example 
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934–35 (1989) (questioning this understanding of the 
Enabling Act); Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542. 
 155. E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 156. These issues include the level of deference courts should afford agency interpretations 
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A more complete justification for trans-substantivity treats the 
principle as a response to various institutional limitations that 
should cabin judicial lawmaking within certain boundaries. To 
summarize, trans-substantivity operates as a “second-best.”157 It 
properly constrains doctrinal evolution where circumstances prevent 
lawmakers from making legitimate, competent, and effective choices 
for the design of process law. This is often the case when judges 
assume responsibility for the creation and maintenance of process 
law. 
 a. Lawmaking legitimacy. When courts craft substance-specific 
process law, they tend to do so to pursue policy objectives that they 
identify. Sometimes courts aim to boost or interfere with the 
regulatory force of the antecedent regime.158 Examples include the 
favorable procedural treatment lower courts afforded Title VII claims 
in the 1970s, as I address below. Sometimes courts deviate from the 
trans-substantive norm to address problems of inefficiency, 
inadequate participation, and other dysfunctions from which a legal 
process for an antecedent regime may appear to suffer.159 Adam Cox 
has suggested, for example, that Judge Posner withholds deference 
from Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretations of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) out of contempt for the 
BIA’s competency.160 
Process doctrines offer decision-makers ways to alter how a legal 
process realizes an antecedent regime’s policy objectives. If another 
institution had crafted the antecedent regime in the first instance, a 
clash of lawmaking prerogative can result. Concerns about the 
legitimacy of judicial choices to mold the antecedent regime, and 
thereby consciously alter how it gets implemented, arise 
frequently.161 Judges trespass on legislative terrain, so the argument 
 
of statutes. 
 157. On the idea of the second-best, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Intepretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 914–15 (2003). 
 158. See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text. 
 159. See infra notes 247–55 and accompanying text. 
 160. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 
1683–84 (2007). 
 161. E.g., Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of 
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 84–90 (1998) (discussing and criticizing 
civil rights-specific summary judgment doctrine); Kim, supra note 116, at 43–44. Cf. Cover, supra 
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goes, when they develop particularized processes to advance ends 
that they, not legislatures, select.162 Critics complain that judges use 
subterfuge to boot, as they cloak what often amounts to a change to 
the antecedent regime in the guise of process law.163 In some 
instances, this criticism might reflect a narrow understanding of 
legitimate judicial power. But some particularly aggressive 
deployments of process law must exceed the bounds of judicial 
authority.164  
Trans-substantivity constrains a judge’s policymaking flexibility 
and thus protects against encroachments on legislative terrain. It 
denies judges the authority to discriminate among substantive 
regimes and thus to make arguably political choices better left to 
coordinate branches.165 Respect for a generality value may 
particularly buttress a court’s institutional legitimacy.166 If so, trans-
substantivity as the value’s manifestation in process law contributes. 
Subjected to trans-substantivity’s constraints, a judge tempted to 
 
note 11, at 731 (“[T]here is something problematic about manipulation of a procedural 
component to undermine the ostensible and articulated rule of law.”). 
 162. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) 
(“We must solve judicial problems, and we must not solve legislative problems.”); Cohen v. 
United States, 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a proposed exemption of IRS action 
from judicial review, in part on grounds that “we are in no position to usurp [Congress’s] 
choice” not to legislate such an exemption); Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in Environmental 
Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 363–64 (1994); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil 
Procedure Rulemaking; Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 666 (2010). 
 163. E.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013, 1091–92 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 84 (1994) (criticizing a Supreme Court decision interpreting 
the Bankruptcy Code that cloaked a policy-driven result in formalist gloss as “flunk[ing] any 
requirement of judicial candor”). One critic of the trans-substantive FRCP says that their 
vagueness, a necessary feature of a trans-substantive system, enables judges to cloak substantive 
policy preferences in individual case decision-making while employing nominally trans-
substantive rules. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474–75 
(1987). But see Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776–79 (1993) (arguing against this indictment of the FRCP). This may be 
so, but, for my purposes, it is beside the point. Doctrine still gets designed, whether it is 
vacuous or not, and pressure on process law to splinter into substance-specific strains is real, 
whether courts need the law-in-books substance-specificity in order to achieve the law-in-action 
substance-specificity. 
 164. E.g., Eskridge, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 163, at 83–84 (discussing an example of 
a case where the Court overstepped proper interpretive bounds). 
 165. Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An 
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 
2076 (1989). 
 166. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 107, at 1013; Fuller, supra note 104, at 366–67. 
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affect the antecedent regime through process law has a choice. She 
can change the process rule trans-substantively, and thus cause all 
sorts of unanticipated and unintended results for substantive areas 
that do not concern her. Alternatively, she can leave the status quo 
in place and let another institution, most likely the legislature, 
address the issue with a substance-specific rule. 
 b. Competency. If trans-substantivity discourages policymaking 
through process law, whatever legitimacy the principle purchases 
may come at a cost, as I suggested earlier. A particular antecedent 
regime may indeed work better if particularized rules sensitive to the 
regime’s peculiar needs regulate the legal process involving it. This 
cost weakens the case for trans-substantivity, however, only if the 
decision-maker contemplating the substance-specific departure can 
reliably identify such regimes and craft process rules that in fact 
address the regimes’ dysfunctions. 
As a general matter, judges may not be particularly competent to 
make these determinations. To craft the right substance-specific 
rule, a court must address two questions: Is the specific problem that 
the court observes unique or systemic, and will a substance-specific 
rule ameliorate it? To answer these queries properly, a court should 
have data, expertise with their analysis, and metrics to evaluate 
outcomes under the trans-substantive rule and the substance-specific 
alternative. Inquiries of this sort differ considerably from the 
standard types of deliberation in which courts engage.167 Even if 
judges could competently undertake data-driven analyses of 
aggregate-level policy needs, the problem of bias remains. Judges 
have not demonstrated any more capacity for dispassionate judgment 
than any of us has.168 Prejudice could interfere with impartial 
assessments not only of which antecedent regimes operate sub-
optimally, but also of whether substance-specific process law could 
help these regimes perform better.169 
 
 167. E.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 309–10. 
 168. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct 
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 891–92 (2012); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2007). 
 169. For suggestions that bias might steer judges in substance-specific directions, see 
generally Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory 
Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37 (1991); Charles S. Ralston, Court v. Congress: Judicial 
Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 205 (1990); 
DO NOT DELETE 2/25/2014 1:26 PM 
1191 Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law 
 1231 
Surely other decision-makers suffer from bias and maladroit 
empiricism. But three features of the institutional structure within 
which courts make decisions exacerbate the potential of these 
deficits to distort process law.170 First, litigation compares poorly 
with other lawmaking processes in terms of the opportunities it 
offers for broad public participation. Parties have robust 
participatory rights, but restrictions otherwise limit nonparties’ 
abilities to bring information to the court that might inform the 
contemplated substance-specific departure.171 Judges rarely invite 
the public to weigh in on possible decisions, as agencies do in 
informal rulemaking. This comparative deficit makes a second 
feature, the often-asymmetric stakes of the parties to a case, all the 
more problematic. If one party is a repeat player, it will have an 
incentive to bring to the court’s attention information about the 
systemic effects of a process doctrine that is helpful to its long-term 
interest. The other party, if a one-time litigant, may lack the 
sophistication or incentive to make the countervailing argument, 
informed by different information. Third, a single decision-maker, or 
at best a small panel of decision-makers, makes judge-made process 
law, whereas many lawmakers, with conflicting biases, participate in 
agency and legislative lawmaking. 
Trans-substantivity protects against inexpert, biased decision-
making in the same way it safeguards lawmaking legitimacy, by 
requiring respect for a generality value and thereby preventing 
distinctions among antecedent regimes. A judge may think that, 
because the EEOC has performed poorly, its interpretation of 
antidiscrimination statutes should not receive the same deference 
that other agency interpretations do.172 But if the judge cannot craft 
an EEOC-tailored deference rule, he will have two options. He will 
have to apply the usual level of deference, or he will have to craft a 
less deferential norm for all agency interpretations. Either way, the 
 
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 
300–01 (1989); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925–27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, 
J., concurring & dissenting). 
 170. For commentary similar to what I offer in this paragraph, see generally Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL 
L. REV. 549, 577–78 (2002). 
 171. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (limiting intervention as of right in civil litigation). 
 172. Cf. Colker, supra note 169, at 160 (suggesting why courts do not want to defer to 
EEOC interpretations). 
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EEOC gets equal treatment. Given given barriers to an across-the-
board decrease in deference, the judge will more likely leave the 
status quo in place. 
 c. Coordination. When judges self-consciously set out to craft 
substance-specific process law, they presumably do so not because 
they want to advantage a specific litigant. Rather, judges believe a 
substance-specific rule will produce better results across-the-board, 
or improve the performance of institutions involved in legal 
processes. A judge who refuses to extend Chevron deference to the 
BIA presumably does so not to advantage a particular immigrant, but 
because she thinks the agency is malfunctioning. The structure of 
the federal judiciary gives reason to doubt the efficacy of this sort of 
intervention, essentially an invitation to the BIA to get its act 
together.173 The individual judge’s prodding will probably achieve 
little unless it is part of a coordinated message to the agency. But 
rarely does anything formal coordinate decision-making from one 
judge to the next in the federal judiciary.174 
Two types of coordination problems plague the creation of 
process law in the judiciary. First, the institutional structure of 
judiciaries may complicate efforts to devise a single approach for a 
particular process law problem. Appellate review, the most obvious 
coordinating device,175 does not work particularly well to steer the 
elaboration of judge-made process law in some unified way. Several 
prominent attempts to craft higher pleading standards for civil rights 
claims, for example, left a mess in their wake. The effort spawned 
intra-circuit incoherence,176 to add to garden-variety circuit splits.177 
 
 173. Cox, supra note 160, at 1683–84. 
 174. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is A They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of 
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 556–63 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty 
Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105–16 (1987). 
 175. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION 333 (2008). 
 176. In 1986, for example, the Ninth Circuit refused to “require alleged constitutional 
violations to be pleaded with greater particularity than in other civil cases.” Bergquist v. Cochise 
Cnty., 806 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1991, it expressly “adopt[ed] a heightened 
pleading standard in cases in which subjective intent is an element of a constitutional tort 
action[,]” with no cite to or discussion of its earlier decision. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 
1386 (9th Cir. 1991). For another example of intra-circuit inconsistency, see Cash Energy, Inc. v. 
Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 899 (D. Mass. 1991) (Keeton, J.) (commenting on the First Circuit’s 
“mixed signals” with respect to pleading requirements in Federal Tort Claims Act suits). 
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Obvious difficulties, like divisions among circuits, explain why 
appellate courts do not solve the problem of coordinated 
policymaking.178 Features of procedural and interpretive doctrine 
exacerbate the problem. Federal case law on statutory interpretation 
lacks stare decisis effect.179 The interlocutory status of many 
procedural decisions and the fact of settlement as the dominant 
endgame for civil litigation make opportunities for appellate 
procedural lawmaking infrequent. A Supreme Court decision on 
process law can exert considerable coordinating force. But the 
Court’s extremely modest capacity sharply limits its ability to police 
doctrinal evolution.180 Trans-substantivity responds to this 
coordination difficulty in a simple way. It limits the types of 
variations in process law, thereby reducing the policy strains needing 
coordination. 
Even if an authoritative decision-maker could craft a substance-
specific departure and ensure a coordinated response to a particular 
problem of process law, a second difficulty, having to do with 
spillover effects, emerges. Perhaps the Supreme Court wants to 
punish the BIA for substandard decision-making by withholding 
Chevron deference. The Court’s decision would solve the coordination 
problem, since lower courts would necessarily follow its lead. If the 
Court were to depart in this manner, however, it would invite lower 
federal courts to do the same for other agencies that lower courts 
believe are similarly dysfunctional. Cacophony in administrative law 
could result.181  
 
 177. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 583–90 (2002) 
(describing complicated circuit splits after Leatherman); Raines v. Starkville, 986 F.2d 1418, 1993 
WL 58707, at *5 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting circuit split pre-Leatherman); Karen M. Blum, 
Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 76–77 (1994) 
(same). For inter-circuit disagreement in another substance-specific pleading context, compare 
Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring a securities fraud 
plaintiff to plead “facts that raise a strong inference of fraudulent intent”), with In re GlenFed, 
Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting a securities fraud 
plaintiff to plead scienter generally). 
 178. Vermeule, supra note 174, at 561–63. 
 179. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1908 (2011); Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to 
Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–84 (2008). 
 180. See generally Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 
122 YALE L.J. 422, 426–31 (2012); Strauss, supra note 174, at 1117. 
 181. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (refusing to permit an IRS-specific 
administrative law norm, on grounds that doing so would “too readily permit[]” exceptions from 
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C. Process Law Made by Other Institutions 
The foregoing argument for trans-substantivity works only for 
judge-made process law. Trans-substantivity has no general 
justification that should limit the legislative prerogative to enact 
substance-specific process law. The wisdom of these departures can 
only be evaluated individually, with particularized inquiries into the 
needs of legal processes involving specific antecedent regimes. 
Although some scholars have argued that legislatures trespass onto 
inherently judicial terrain when they manipulate process law,182 the 
position is a minority one,183 and legislatures likely enjoy broad 
powers to legislate process law as they see fit. Put differently, the 
process law that legislatures craft, trans-substantive or not, is every 
bit as legitimate as any other statute they pass.184 Their competence 
to forge good-quality doctrine may be lacking. But there is nothing 
peculiar about process law that uniquely limits the range of 
legitimate legislative choice. Statutes also have the robust 
coordinating power that a single judicial opinion lacks. 
Trans-substantivity continues to influence procedural doctrine 
fashioned in rulemaking processes,185 and rightly so. Rulemakers, 
such as those on the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, might 
not suffer from deficits of competency and coordination to the extent 
 
the norm for other agencies). For a suggestion from the Court that this sort of logic has 
influenced the trans-substantive design of criminal procedure doctrine, see Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
 182. Jellum, supra note 138, at 879–97 (making a version of this argument for interpretive 
doctrine); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and 
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1297–98 (1993) (making the argument for 
procedural doctrine). 
 183. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1683–84 (2004) (responding to Mullenix’s argument); Rosenkranz, supra 
note 127, at 2140 (arguing that interpretive statutes in the main are probably constitutional). 
 184. Another way to say this is to argue that generality as a value commands less deference 
for legislation, which can more legitimately discriminate based upon political considerations. 
Fuller, supra note 104, at 366–67. 
 185. E.g., Rule 23, October 1997, in Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 6–7, 1997, 
Agenda Materials, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Minutes/cv10-97.htm (explaining that the Advisory Committee abandoned a mass tort class 
action proposal for fear of Enabling Act problems); Minutes, Federal Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee Meeting, Feb. 16–17, 1995, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, 206 (1997) (“A specific mass torts 
rule may seem so laden with substantive overtones as to raise legitimate doubts about the 
wisdom of invoking regular rulemaking procedures.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/25/2014 1:26 PM 
1191 Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law 
 1235 
that individual judges devising doctrine do.186 But the authority of 
these committees to act as lawmakers remains in question decades 
after their establishment.187 Were rulemakers to discriminate among 
antecedent regimes for particularized procedural treatment, they 
would put at risk the modicum of political neutrality that trans-
substantivity otherwise offers.188 Procedural rulemaking cannot 
proceed entirely apart from politics, but there are degrees of politics 
in the exercise. Those instances when rulemakers have proposed 
specialized treatment for particular categories of litigation have 
provoked particular resistance.189 
The sort of court I have had in mind up to this point is a federal 
court. The trans-substantive justification for process law made by 
common law courts differs. State judges face fewer legitimacy 
obstacles to the creation of substance-specific process law, 
particularly for common law claims that these judges create and 
maintain in the first instance.190 If state appellate courts can 
meaningfully police the huge number of decisions that their lower 
court colleagues render, well in excess of what federal district judges 
handle,191 the coordination problem might recede as well. The 
number of decision-makers needing coordination is lower,192 and 
many states have practices, such as a presumption against published 
opinions, that decrease the total number of precedential decisions 
that need to be harmonized.193 To the extent that state process law 
 
 186. Marcus, Institutions, supra note 153, at 944–46. 
 187. Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 29 
(1996). Cf. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 549 (discussing this issue). 
 188. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542–43. In addition, were a rulemaking 
committee to opt for substance-specific rules, it would have to make dozens of specific rules for 
one issue instead of a generic one, and it would magnify the potential for institutional gridlock 
fueled by normative disputes over translation problems that particular substantive regimes 
ostensibly cause. 
 189. The maturity requirement the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee proposed in 
the 1990s for mass tort class actions is one example. E.g., David Marcus, The Creation and 
Renewal of the Class Action System, 1953–1999, at 101–04 (April 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 190. Burbank, Complexity, supra note 163, at 1475. 
 191. E.g., Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: “Neither Out Far Nor 
In Deep”, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 715–17 (1995). 
 192. For example, about 100 judges staff the California Courts of Appeal, well below the 
180 or so federal appellate judges. 
 193. E.g., CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF 
COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 2006). 
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should remain trans-substantive, a concern for doctrinal coherence 
might explain why. Lawmaking legitimacy plausibly counsels against 
substance-specificity, even at the state level, when the antecedent 
regime involved is statutory and thus made by the legislature. 
Confusion in the application and creation of process law might ensue 
were state courts to respect the trans-substantive norm in these 
instances, but then routinely craft substance-specific rules when the 
common law provides the antecedent regime. 
Problems of legitimacy, competency, and coordination are hardly 
unique to the generation and maintenance of process law. All law 
that requires judicial elaboration suffers from these deficits. But 
responses abound in process law. They include, for example, the Erie 
Doctrine, the Chevron Doctrine, and a whole range of justiciability 
doctrines. The trans-substantivity principle, as a second-best, 
provides just one of many mechanisms that address judicial 
institutional limitations. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINAL DESIGN 
Few proceduralists have defended trans-substantivity, at least in 
the abstract, as a principle of doctrinal design.194 Particular 
substance-specific departures in actual doctrine, in contrast, have 
frequently provoked distress. The most notable substance-specific 
procedural rules have caused consternation,195 scholars rail against 
exceptionalism in administrative doctrine,196 and specific 
interpretive practices for particular statutes have drawn critical 
fire.197 A gap divides theory from practice: trans-substantivity holds 
little generic appeal, but, to judge by the commentary, decision-
makers departing from the norm keep getting it wrong. 
This disarray in the literature on trans-substantivity reflects a 
striking limitation. This scholarship has not yet offered a general 
metric to judge substance-specific process law. In this Part, I use my 
institutional justification for the principle’s persistence in judge-
 
 194. In procedural commentary, the notable outliers are Paul Carrington and Geoffrey 
Hazard. Carrington, Manifestly Unfounded Assertions, supra note 165; Hazard, Trans-Substantive 
Virtues, supra note 73. 
 195. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 196. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 114, at 581. 
 197. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The Conflict 
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 657–73 (2005) (arguing for an 
end to specialized interpretive practices for the antitrust statutes). 
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made process law to explain how and under what circumstances 
trans-substantivity should persist in doctrinal design. A court may 
craft a substance-specific process rule under circumstances that 
mitigate the harmful effect of the court’s institutional limitations or 
when other institutions are even more poorly-situated to do the job. 
As a general matter,198 when a court fashions a particular substance-
specific rule, its desirability hinges in large measure on the goal the 
court believes the new rule serves. A court can most likely overcome 
its institutional limitations and properly craft a substance-specific 
rule when the court does so to enable the legal process to achieve 
the policy objectives in the antecedent regime more accurately. 
My analysis also offers guidance for another problem of doctrinal 
design. As I described in Part I, process law is often articulated in 
trans-substantive terms but then lends itself to regularized patterns 
of substance-specific application. In some instances, this doctrine 
loses its trans-substantive character entirely and becomes 
unambiguously substance-specific. Trans-substantivity as justified by 
institutional considerations can inform the design of doctrine that 
fits at this position on the spectrum. The principle can help decision-
makers craft trans-substantive rules such that these rules in 
application do not move in a substance-specific direction. 
A. Court-Made Substance-Specific Process Law 
Most arguments for substance-specific process law make first-
best sorts of claims.199 In one way or another, this advocacy asserts 
that the process for resolving disputes involving a particular 
antecedent regime will achieve better results with a substance-
specific rule. Robert Cover engaged in this sort of analysis in his 
 
 198. On specialized courts and the wisdom of substance-specific doctrine they apply, see, 
for example, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1995) (commenting on the Federal 
Circuit’s ability to create a coherent, and thus coordinated, body of law); Benjamin & Rai, supra 
note 12, at 313–16 (discussing the competency of the Federal Circuit to craft patent-specific 
administrative law); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (1989). 
 199. E.g., Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on 
Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, at 4 (April 15, 2009); 
Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 13, at 45–56; Burbank & Subrin, supra note 119, at 412; Jay 
Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1808–09 (1992); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 114, at 547–48. 
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article that coined the term “trans-substantive.”200 The first-best 
approach is incomplete, however, if it ignores the institutional 
setting in which the decision to deviate from the trans-substantive 
norm must be made. The second-best inquiry, informed by the 
justifications for trans-substantivity in the first place, asks whether 
circumstances are such that the court can overcome its institutional 
limitations and legitimately, competently, and effectively craft 
substance-specific doctrine. For generalist courts, when they can do 
so depends on the motivation for the substance-specific departure. I 
describe possible motivations for these departures first, then 
elaborate on my metric for substance-specific process law forged by 
courts. 
1. Motivations for substance-specificity 
 a. Fidelity. A judge might be tempted to depart from the trans-
substantive norm if a substance-specific process rule would help a 
legal process realize the policy objectives in the antecedent regime 
more completely. As I describe below, particularized class action 
doctrine for Title VII cases evolved in the 1970s for this reason, to 
achieve the statutes’ broad remedial objectives more successfully.201 
Judges also might want to develop substance-specific process law to 
interfere with the realization of an antecedent regime. Doctrine 
specific to the litigation of Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims, also 
described below, developed in the 1970s to absolve defendants from 
liability that courts found unattractive. Such departures either serve 
or undermine what I call “fidelity.” 
Process law pursues a fidelity goal when it steers decision-
makers toward resolutions that best achieve the antecedent regime’s 
objectives in light of the relevant factual circumstances. The goal 
particularly animates procedural and interpretive doctrine.202 
 
 200. Cover, supra note 11, at 732–35. 
 201. See infra notes 240–41 and accompanying text; see also Note, Antidiscrimination Class 
Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 
868, 886 (1979). 
 202. Jeremy Bentham had something like fidelity in mind when he coined the term 
“adjective law” to describe procedural and evidentiary doctrine. IX JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE 
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 477 (1827) (“[T]he system of 
adjective law, is a means to an end. That end is, or ought to be, the execution of the commands 
issued, the fulfillment of the predictions delivered, of the engagements taken, by the system of 
substantive law.”). Charles Clark did as well when he insisted that procedural doctrine serve as 
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Fidelity is not as dominant a goal in administrative law,203 but core 
doctrine manifests its pull. If Congress delegates rulemaking power 
to an agency with instructions for its exercise, the agency acts 
arbitrarily and capriciously if it does not heed them.204 A great deal 
of interpretive theory conceives of judges as legislative agents of one 
stripe or another, with obligations of faithfulness to legislative intent 
that the role requires.205 
 b. Institutional efficacy. Many substance-specific departures in 
process law—the standard the IRS uses to distinguish between 
legislative and interpretive rules, for example,206 or the deference 
some courts withhold from EEOC interpretations of Title VII207—
have little to do with fidelity, at least expressly. Some of this process 
law deviates from the trans-substantive norm to pursue goals of 
what I call “institutional efficacy.” Perhaps federal courts should 
defer less to EEOC interpretations of Title VII than they otherwise 
would to an agency’s statutory interpretation, for example, because 
judicial competence to craft antidiscrimination policy compares 
particularly favorably to the agency’s.208 Institutional efficacy is an 
 
“a handmaid rather than [a] mistress” to “the work of justice.” Clark, Handmaid, supra note 73, 
at 297; see also Charles E. Clark, Methods of Legal Reform, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 106, 111 (1929) 
(“Procedure is a tool, a means to an end and not an end in itself. That end is the application of 
rules of substantive law to the case in hand.”). Legal economists include accuracy as one of two 
chief goals for a procedural regime. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.1, at 
583 (7th ed. 2007). Lawrence Lessig uses the term “fidelity” to describe the “goal” of the 
interpretive enterprise. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1173 
(1993) (“I take as given the judiciary’s (at least feigned) commitment to fidelity [in textual 
interpretation] as its goal.”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 
1371 (1997) (explaining what “fidelity” means). 
 203. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1675 (1975). Still, Paul Verkuil identifies the “accuracy of decisions” as a central objective 
for administrative procedure. Verkuil, supra note 77, at 279. 
 204. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 205. E.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
113 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
415 (1989); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Book Note, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. 
REV. 919, 931 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1987)). 
 206. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, supra note 118, at 101–03. 
 207. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: 
Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 54–55. 
 208. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1252 
(2001) (making this suggestion for the Supreme Court). 
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umbrella category that covers a range of goals that relate to 
imperfections in or limitations of the institutions involved in legal 
processes. These goals include efficiency, optimal participation, 
reasoned deliberation, comparative institutional competence, and 
residual institutional legitimacy. 
A number of scholars pair efficiency with fidelity as the twin 
goals procedural doctrine serves.209 A host of doctrines pursue cost 
mitigation. Some, like expansive joinder rules, lower barriers to 
entry for legal processes, while others, like discovery limits and case 
management tools, provide mechanisms to protect against outcome 
distortions that the expense of litigation might produce. Concerns 
about inefficiencies in public administration have spurred various 
reforms, such as direct final rulemaking210 and deadlines for agency 
adjudication.211 Efficiency provides a normative yardstick for 
varieties of interpretive theory as well. Some textualists, for example, 
justify semantic canons of construction, such as expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, as defaults that spare legislators the costs of having to 
anticipate all possible interpretive problems when they draft 
statutes.212 
A variety of procedural and administrative doctrines attempt to 
optimize participation. These doctrines balance access by those 
affected by legal processes against harms caused by excessive or 
insufficient participation. Examples include the law of res judicata and 
notice-and-comment requirements for rulemaking. Doctrines that 
calibrate the degree to which participant preferences should dictate 
the outcomes of legal processes also fit into this sub-category. Rules 
regulating civil settlement in various contexts213 and the doctrine 
governing negotiated rulemaking are illustrative. 
 
 209. E.g., Verkuil, supra note 77, at 279–80; POSNER, supra note 202, § 21.1, at 593; Robert 
G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1160 
(2006). 
 210. E.g., Guidance for FDA and Industry: Direct Final Rule Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 
62466 (Feb. 21, 1997). 
 211. SCOTT SZYMENDERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33374, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
INSURANCE (SSDI) AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI): THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION 
AND APPEALS PROCESS 3–4 (2006). 
 212. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983). Another 
example from textualist interpretive theory is the argument that courts should not use 
legislative history because it is too time-consuming and burdensome to sift through. Kenneth 
W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377. 
 213. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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Reasoned deliberation offers a taproot of legitimacy for public 
administration and civil litigation, two processes with tenuous 
connections to mechanisms for democratic accountability.214 
Consistent with this idea, a wide array of doctrines push decision-
makers toward better quality decision-making. In administrative law, 
these include grand obligations, such as those imposed by the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard for agency action.215 They also 
encompass more granular requirements, such as the requirement 
that administrative law judges provide a reasoned decision to 
support their social security benefit determinations.216 When judges 
act at the edge of their legitimate power in litigation, rules 
particularly encourage reasoned deliberation. Rule 23 for class 
certification decisions217 and Rule 65 for the issuance of injunctive 
relief function in this manner.218 
Doctrines frequently address concerns of comparative 
institutional competence and administrative burden and thereby 
respond to process problems that tax decision-makers’ capacities to 
produce good resolutions. These doctrines reallocate decision-
making authority from the comparatively incompetent institution to 
the better-equipped one,219 relieve the decision-maker of authority 
altogether,220 impose bright-line rules that deny decision-makers 
discretion when they might exercise it poorly,221 and provide 
heuristics to assist decision-makers as they deal with particularly 
technical or otherwise demanding problems.222 
Each of the foregoing institutional efficacy goals relates in some 
manner or another to the legitimacy of litigation and public 
 
 214. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19–24 (2001); Owen M. Fiss, The 
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983). 
 215. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 24–25. 
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006). 
 217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; e.g., Cortez v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., 399 F. App’x 246 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (vacating a district court’s denial of class certification on grounds that district court 
“fail[ed] to explain its reasons”). 
 218. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(A). 
 219. E.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) 
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”). 
 220. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (denying that courts could review an 
agency’s refusal to take enforcement action). 
 221. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 222. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and 
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658–59 (1992). 
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administration as legal processes. To the extent that these specific 
goals do not cover the landscape, residual institutional legitimacy, a 
catch-all goal, explains additional contours of process law. The 
avoidance canon is one example of a doctrine that does not quite fit 
elsewhere but certainly involves institutional efficacy. Aggressive 
judicial review might imperil the federal courts’ legitimacy if 
unelected judges were to interfere with legislative outputs anytime 
they could find a colorable constitutional infirmity. The canon 
counsels courts to adopt a less natural reading of the statute and 
thereby dodge its invalidation. It helps keep judicial powder dry for 
cases that resist such finesse,223 even if the canon steers decision-
makers to a less faithful reading of the statute.224 
My examples thus far show how process law responds to 
institutional limits and dysfunctions as they arise during legal 
processes. Sometimes process law pursues an institutional efficacy 
goal more indirectly, by encouraging decision-makers to make up for 
deficiencies in the institution that crafted the antecedent regime. A 
lot of statutory interpretation doctrine functions in this manner. 
Legislatures enact incomplete statutes for a variety of reasons, 
including the limits of human foresight and strategic ambiguity as a 
legislative tactic. Semantic canons of construction arguably address 
this institutional deficit by providing off-the-rack meaning to fill in 
the gaps.225 Representation-reinforcing substantive canons work 
analogously. Politically marginalized groups that lack robust 
legislative representation sometimes benefit from canons that break 
interpretive ties in their favor.226 
Fidelity and institutional efficacy are not the only goals process 
law serves. Fairness to affected persons and entities, for example, is 
another goal. The preceding discussion offers just an introduction to  
 
 
 223. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 
397, 401 (2005). 
 224. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (complaining that 
the Court’s use of the avoidance doctrine was tantamount to rewriting the statute to say what 
Congress refused to say). 
 225. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 163, at 66–67. 
 226. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 869 (2012); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 168–87 (2008). 
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fidelity and institutional efficacy, enough to derive a normative 
metric for substance-specific process law that courts develop.  
2. When should judge-made process law be substance-specific? 
Fidelity and institutional efficacy often motivate the design of 
doctrines in process law, and they are therefore important to a 
metric to evaluate substance-specific departures. Courts can most 
likely overcome the institutional limitations I described in Part 
IV(b)(2) with pro-fidelity departures, or deviations from the trans-
substantive norm undertaken to resolve a legal process in a way that 
more faithfully realizes the antecedent regime’s objectives. These 
departures come in two varieties. The first variety of pro-fidelity 
departures occurs when the antecedent regime itself encodes a 
preference for substance-specificity; when courts craft a substance-
specific rule for disputes involving the regime, they effectively 
implement implicit legislative will. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the federal courts generally understood Title VII not as a device for 
the individualized remediation of discriminatory workplace episodes, 
but as a mandate for the reconfiguration of the American workplace 
in favor of protected classes.227 This understanding of Title VII had a 
logical procedural corollary: to ensure judgments that actually 
implemented this objective, federal courts should do what they could 
to have Title VII cases proceed as class actions.228 Courts heeded 
this latent procedural preference by developing several substance-
specific applications of class action procedure that all-but-guaranteed 
the certification of broad Title VII classes.229 
The second variety of pro-fidelity departures finds its 
justification in its effects, not implicit legislative will. The trans-
substantive rule may not account for underlying conditions that 
systematically frustrate the realization of the antecedent regime’s 
policy goals, making a substance-specific rule necessary. One of the 
 
 227. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969); see also Hutchings 
v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970); Evans v. Local Union 2127, Int’l Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 
421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 228. During debates over the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the latent congressional 
preference was made more explicit. See George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 688, 716 (1980). 
 229. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 639–43 (2013). 
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examples Robert Cover offered in his famous treatment of trans-
substantivity illustrates this point. A man left slaves to his legatees 
with the instruction that the slaves be freed once Virginia law 
permitted manumission. After the estate’s executor had been 
discharged, Virginia law changed, but the legatees did not honor the 
testator’s wishes. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals let the 
discharged executor sue to enforce the will’s terms, even though the 
ordinary rule denied discharged executors standing to do so.230 This 
law better realized the antecedent regime’s policy objectives. Virginia 
law permitted manumission and privileged testator intent, policies 
that the unanticipated circumstances would have frustrated had the 
generic standing rule prevailed. 
The institutional deficits that otherwise favor trans-substantivity 
in process law cause less trouble for pro-fidelity departures. To the 
extent that a court can connect its substance-specific rule to 
instructions encoded within the antecedent regime, or to the extent 
that a court neutralizes an obviously unforeseen impediment to the 
realization of the regime’s goals, it derives the authority for its 
policymaking venture from legislative will. The danger of judicial 
usurpation of legislative prerogative lessens for that reason. The 
need to justify a substance-specific departure in terms of legislative 
will or preference protects at least partially against departures driven 
by the judge’s bias or incompetent analysis. If evidence of this 
implicit legislative will is reasonably clear, it also provides a 
coordinating mechanism beyond the mere persuasiveness of the 
judge’s reasoning to ensure that the departure achieves its intended 
goal. 
For analogous reasons, anti-fidelity departures, or departures 
undertaken to frustrate the implementation of an antecedent regime, 
have the most tenuous claim to legitimacy. These departures result 
when the antecedent regime’s accurate realization provokes judicial 
distaste. An example of this is the heightened pleading standards 
that judges forged for civil rights litigants starting in the 1960s.231 
Depending upon how one views it,232 the judicial revolt against the 
 
 230. Cover, supra note 11, at 724. 
 231. E.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 471–73 (1986). For an early case, see Valley v. Maule, 297 F. 
Supp. 958, 960–61 (D. Conn. 1968). 
 232. Some courts justified their refusal to permit the certification of TILA claims by 
arguing that Congress did not intend such huge liabilities for debtors. E.g., Kriger v. European 
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class certification of TILA cases might be another example.233 TILA 
provides for statutory damages that creditors must pay all nominally-
injured debtors. Claims brought for these damages fit the 
requirements for class certification perfectly. They do not require 
plaintiffs to prove individual causation or amount of injury, just the 
defendants’ liability. In the 1970s, however, a number of district 
courts blanched at certifying TILA classes. They believed that class 
actions threatened defendants with aggregate liability in amounts 
that vastly exceeded any real culpability for wrongdoing.234 Hence, 
these courts in effect wrote an exception for TILA claims into FRCP 
23. 
If the departure’s relationship to fidelity can help determine 
whether the court surmounts its institutional deficits, then the goal 
can also help decide the wisdom of substance-specific departures 
motivated in the first instance by institutional efficacy. If these 
departures have pro-fidelity effects, they may be more proper. Those 
with anti-fidelity effects pose more difficulties. The district judges 
who rebelled against notice pleading in 1950s-era antitrust litigation 
did so chiefly on efficacy grounds.235 The minimal pleading standard, 
they believed, opened the door in big antitrust cases to dispiritingly 
burdensome and inefficient discovery. But, the Second Circuit 
opined, these judges had no business privileging this concern over 
Congress’s intent to rid the American marketplace of anticompetitive 
conduct.236 
Substance-specific departures taken for institutional efficacy 
reasons pose the hardest evaluative problem when they have either 
uncertain fidelity effects or no fidelity effects at all. The canon that 
instructs judges to construe ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of immigrants has no effect on the accuracy of cancellation of 
removal proceedings since the canon is supposed to apply only in 
 
Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
 233. E.g., In re Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc.-Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
(FACTA) Litigation, No. 08-01980, 2010 WL 5071073 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2010) (discussing 
TILA cases); David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Stability in 
Civil Procedure, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1231, 1250–51 (2012); cf. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 
F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that such denials of class certification are borne of the 
judge’s dislike of the operation of the substantive law); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 
F.3d 708, 722 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). 
 234. Marcus, supra note 233, at 1250–51. 
 235. Dawson, supra note 81, at 431. 
 236. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957). 
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instances of irreducible ambiguity in the INA.237 Insofar as concerns 
for judicial efficiency motivated it,238 the maturity requirement for 
class certification that evolved in mass tort litigation of the 1990s is 
another example.239 The requirement emerged from the idea that a 
mass tort is “immature” until the litigation of individual lawsuits 
reveal the tort’s legal and factual merit, as well as the central issues 
that determine any individual plaintiff’s right to recover.240 A few 
courts followed the lead of influential commentators and declined to 
grant class certification in cases involving so-called immature torts. 
Defenders of the maturity requirement insisted that it had a pro-
fidelity effect: if courts certified immature torts, they argued, risk-
averse defendants would settle without knowing if the payments 
reflected claim value.241 Critics maintained that by thwarting class 
certification, the maturity requirement robbed plaintiffs’ lawyers of 
badly-needed economies of scale, took away their incentives to invest 
in litigation, and thus prevented outcomes merited by the 
substantive law.242 
Efficacy-driven departures from the trans-substantive norm, such 
as the maturity requirement or the pro-immigrant canon, are 
problematic, although less so than anti-fidelity departures. The 
problem of lawmaking legitimacy lessens because the departure 
either does nothing to interfere with legislative will (the pro-
immigrant canon), or it has a plausible pro-fidelity effect (the 
maturity requirement). The problems of competence and bias 
remain, however, as the criticism greeting judicial use of the 
maturity requirement illustrates.243 Also, the motivation for the 
departure lies with the court’s own assessment of institutional need, 
 
 237. E.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 204 (D. Mass. 2004) (providing a 
particularly thorough discussion of this canon). 
 238. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 239. For deployments of this requirement, see id.; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1297–98 (7th Cir. 1995); Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 212 F.R.D. 380, 389 (E.D. Tenn. 
2002). For maturity as a substance-specific requirement, see Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Grant, 873 So. 
2d 100, 102 (Miss. 2004) (Diskinson, J., concurring) (“I see no justification for carving out an 
exception to the application of [Mississippi’s permissive joinder rule] for ‘mature torts.’”). 
 240. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 610–11 (Tex. 1998). 
 241. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298. 
 242. David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special 
Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 709–10 (1989). 
 243. E.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1357, 1424–28 (2003). 
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and nothing externally-fixed, such as implicit legislative will, 
coordinates decision-making. 
Some substance-specific departures for institutional efficacy 
reasons may nonetheless fall within the judge’s legitimate discretion. 
The questions are whether any other institution can respond better 
to the efficacy concern than the court can, and whether the efficacy 
problem is one that requires coordinated policymaking to solve. In 
other words, even if the court contemplating the departure suffers 
from institutional deficits, perhaps alternate institutions suffer from 
even worse deficits. 
The pro-immigrant canon passes muster by the terms of this 
analysis. Immigrants with contested claims to remain in the United 
States have little voice politically. This particular disadvantage makes 
Congress a comparatively inferior institution to weigh the merits of 
the immigrant’s cause. The disadvantage also lessens the legitimacy 
difficulties posed by judicial lawmaking. The pro-immigrant canon is 
a good example of one of Einer Elhauge’s “preference-eliciting” 
default rules for statutory interpretation.244 Immigrant 
underrepresentation makes a legislative response particularly likely, 
were Congress to recoil at judicial interpretations of the INA that 
favored immigrants too significantly.245 The pro-immigrant canon 
also does not require coordinated policymaking to have its intended 
effect. When a court uses the canon to break an interpretive tie, it 
responds to the problem of under-representation as the problem 
affects the status of the immigrant involved in the particular removal 
proceedings. The fact that other courts do not also deploy the canon 
does not subtract from the benefit the canon yields when it does get 
used. 
The comparative institutional analysis comes out differently for 
the maturity requirement. At least two alternative institutions 
plausibly could have generated the requirement as an amendment to 
Rule 23. The legislative dynamics favored the requirement’s 
beneficiaries. Mass tort defendants had powerful congressional allies, 
and trial lawyers, an otherwise powerful political lobby, split over 
the wisdom of mass tort class actions.246 Even had Congress been 
 
 244. See generally Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162 (2002). 
 245. Cf. ELHAUGE, supra note 226, at 168–87 (2008) (discussing how courts can elicit the 
preferences of legislatures in cases involving politically underrepresented populations). 
 246. E.g., David Marcus, The Creation and Renewal of the Class Action System, 1953–99, 
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hostile to coalitions that might have supported the requirement, the 
Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee remained viable as a source. 
In fact, the committee seriously considered an amendment to Rule 
23 that would have created a maturity requirement.247 Absent 
evidence of legislative or rulemaking occlusion, other institutions 
could have undertaken the substance-specific departure. Moreover, 
at least in the 1990s when the requirement emerged, the 
coordination problem was a real one. One court could deploy the 
maturity requirement to deny class certification only to have another 
jurisdiction’s court ignore the requirement and grant class 
certification. The alleged harm that motivated the first court’s use of 
the requirement would thus result.248 
B. Trans-Substantivity and the Slide Toward Substance-Specificity 
Trans-substantivity, conceived of as a “second-best” motivated 
by institutional limitations, also has implications for the choice 
between rules and standards in the design of process law. In Part I, I 
distinguished between process law that is unambiguously substance-
specific, such as the securities-specific pleading standard, and 
process law that is articulated in trans-substantive terms but lends 
itself to regularized patterns of substance-specific application. An 
example of the latter is the Mead metric for determining when courts 
should use Chevron to assess agency interpretations of statutes. I 
observed that rules in this category can harden into unambiguously 
substance-specific doctrine once an authoritative decision-maker 
acts.249 
This second category of process law creates a problem that 
resembles the challenge that substance-specific process law poses. A 
court might apply a trans-substantive rule in a substance-specific 
way because it believes that the costs of trans-substantivity for the 
antecedent regime at issue outweigh the principle’s benefits. 
Legitimacy, competency, and coordination problems may distort this 
determination, just as they confound judicial decisions to craft 
 
at 76–77 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 247. Id. at 99. 
 248. Cf. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133 
(3d Cir. 1998) (describing the federal judiciary’s inability to enjoin a state court’s decision to 
grant class certification that came on the heels of the federal court’s decision not to do so in a 
mass torts case). 
 249. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
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unambiguously substance-specific law. A number of commentators, 
for example, have complained that the federal courts treat EEOC 
interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with 
particular skepticism. This judicial hostility may conflict with 
congressional intent for the amount of deference the EEOC’s 
interpretations should enjoy.250 The particular aggressiveness with 
which the federal courts have applied the nominally trans-
substantive summary judgment standard in antidiscrimination cases 
might reflect the influence of bias at a conscious or subconscious 
level.251 
The prospect of poorly-applied process law should inform how 
rulemakers devise trans-substantive rules. When a process doctrine 
can plausibly take the form of a rule or a standard, the institutional 
justifications for trans-substantivity counsel in favor of a rule. A 
judge has to do more work to apply a trans-substantive rule in a 
substance-specific way based upon his or her perceptions that a 
particular antecedent regime would benefit from particularized 
treatment. To do so, the judge has to announce an unambiguously 
substance-specific exception, rather than cloak the particularized 
application in the flexible generalities of a trans-substantive 
standard. Authoritative decision-makers can thereby better police 
these deviations from the trans-substantive norm. For at least fifty 
years, an understanding of the federal pleading threshold that 
couched the threshold in terms of a rule prevailed. During this 
period, the Supreme Court rebuffed efforts several times to raise the 
threshold for particular categories of claims.252 The pleading 
threshold softened into a standard in 2007, and as applied it may 
have a disparate impact on particular categories of claims.253 Given 
the standard’s slippery language, authoritative decision-makers will  
 
 
 250. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1937, 1950–51 (2006); Colker, supra note 169, at 160. See generally Ruth Colker, The Mythic 
43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (commenting on the 
Supreme Court’s hostility to the anti-subordination intent of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act). 
 251. E.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal 
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 710–12 (2007). 
 252. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 162 (1993). 
 253. E.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012). 
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likely have more difficulty keeping it from sliding toward substance-
specificity in application. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For a long time, academic discussion of trans-substantivity has 
proceeded almost entirely within the narrow world of procedural 
commentary. The principle became identified with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules are sacred to many a 
proceduralist, and the principle thus assumed somewhat of a 
mythical status. But trans-substantivity is not just a principle for the 
design of procedural doctrine, and it certainly is not something 
sacrosanct. Trans-substantivity is a prudential principle, one that 
reflects and responds to the imperfections of institutions involved in 
the processes of American law. As long as these imperfections 
remain, the justification for trans-substantivity’s persistence does as 
well. 
 
